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In private industry, the goal of the organization is
often to maximize profit. The Federal Government does not
have this simple a measure by which to gauge success or
failure. However, the goal to maximize profit is based on
two underlying principles that do relate to the operations
performed by the Federal Government. Those two principles
are efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency is attained by
minimizing waste in the generation of output, and
effectiveness is attained by that ouput achieving the
Federal Government's goals. To produce its output and
achieve its goals, the Government must use resources. These
resources are not unlimited and they are acguired through
taxation of the people. When these resources are wasted or
when the goals are not achieved, the people exhibit very
strong concerns. They measure the success or failure of the
Federal Government by their knowledge or perceptions of how
goals are being accomplished and how resources are being
used. Congress, sensitive to the needs and concerns of the
governed, passed the Federal Manager's Financial Integrity
Act of 1982 (FMFIA) [Ref. 1] . The Act was designed to
increase the use of internal controls throughout the Federal
Government [Ref. 2]. A period of six years has elapsed
since that Act's passage and the Department of the
Navy has implemented a program to meet the reguirements of
that Act [Ref . 3]
.
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the
implementation and execution of the Navy's Internal Control
Program at the local activity level. The first step in
trying to achieve that goal was to select an activity that
provided a wide diversity of functions with a high
susceptibility to fraud, waste and abuse. A second step was
to look for an activity that supported both operational
forces and shore based facilities. The third and final step
for selecting an activity was to find one that had a
permanently assigned Naval Audit Service auditor. A
reguirement for an on-site auditor was felt to be necessary
for obtaining an external evaluation of the local activity's
performance regarding the use of internal controls. The
only type of activity to meet all of the preceding
reguirements was a Naval Shipyard. Naval Shipyards are the
only Navy shore activities that have permanently assigned
on-site auditors. As an industrial activity of major
importance, the shipyard has numerous functions which are
representative of both Federal and private business
activities. Some typical common functions are the sales
cycle, the collections cycle, the manufacturing cycle, the
purchasing cycle and automated data processing cycle.
Because these cycles are commonplace this study may provide
a sense of how a typical internal control program evolved
and is currently being used to protect resources. One of
the shipyard's primary mechanisms used to monitor the use of
its resources is the Navy's Industrial Fund. The Industrial
Fund is a revolving fund that is reimbursed through the
purchase of services by its customers. Annual expenditures
for the eight active shipyards during Fiscal Year 1987 was
approximately $3.7 billion and expenditures for Fiscal Year
1988 are projected to be $3.4 billion [Ref. 4].
The specific objectives of this thesis are to:
(1) Identify the basic requirements of internal controls,
(2) Trace the history of internal control in the Federal
Government and the Department of Defense,
(3) Identify the key individuals responsible for local
implementation,
(4) Identify the types of internal controls being used,
(5) Evaluate the use of internal controls used to correct
problems,
(6) Describe the attitudes of the key individuals and
their perceptions of the benefits of having an
internal control program.
C. SCOPE, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis was directed primarily toward a review of
one shipyard's internal control program, with special
emphasis on examining the specific controls used to correct
actual or potential errors existing within that shipyard's
functions. A major assumption for this study was that, if
the shipyard had not implemented an internal control
program, there would have been no other internal method
developed to cause line managers to evaluate how efficiently
or effectively their functions operate. The fact that,
until after the passage of FMFIA, there were no records to
document whether line managers were in the habit of
evaluating their areas of responsibility was the basis upon
which the previous assumption was made. Without an internal
control program, it was assumed that the ability of the
Secretary of Defense to certify the effectiveness of his
department ' s internal controls would have been most
difficult.
This study was limited to on-site field work within a
single shipyard and all contacts with the Naval Sea Systems
Command were made through the use of telephone interviews.
D. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This study was designed to be accomplished in four
phases. Phase one was a historical search of the applicable
laws, instructions and reports that pertained to the Navy's
eventual implementation of a formal internal control
program. The historical search for information was
necessary in order to provide the basis for identifying the
methods and measures needed to conduct phases two and three.
Additionally, phase one was done so as to understand how the
program evolved at the different administrative levels
within the Department of Defense, which were responsible for
executing the requirements of the Federal Manager's
Financial Integrity Act of 1982.
Phase two encompasses the selection, contact and
preliminary survey of an appropriate local activity for
field work. The selection of a shipyard was based on its
representation of a wide variety of financial, support and
production functions. Each of those functions have a
significant potential for resources being subjected to
fraud, waste and abuse. A shipyard is a good candidate for
study because it has a significant impact on and interfaces
with both operational and non-operational forces within the
Navy. The importance for having that interface within this
study is because all important shore activities exist in the
Navy to support the Fleet. The more support a shore
activity provides, the greater its importance to the overall
mission of the Navy. Usually, the largest assembly of the
Navy's assets are in direct support of fleet operations.
The next part of phase two was to establish formal contacts
with shipyard representatives. This part opened the
channels of communication needed to gain access to records
and line managers for conducting field work during phase
three. The final part of phase two was a preliminary survey
of the shipyard. A preliminary survey allowed for the
opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge about
organizational relationships and it allowed first-hand
examination of records for determining the appropriate
functions to be selected for the phase three case studies.
Phase three focuses on the actual on-site field work.
This field work was designed to identify the local program,
obtain the requirements of that program, conduct interviews
about the attitudes of the supporting organization and
develop six case studies. The six case studies were used to
examine specific examples of internal controls used to
prevent material errors.
Phase four, the last phase, deals with interpreting the
results from phases two and three.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter I is an introduction. It explains the
importance of internal controls and describes the goals and
objectives for this study. The scope and research method
were briefly discussed to provide a frame of reference for
the information to be presented.
Chapter II is a general description of what internal
controls are and what things need to be considered when
attempting to utilize internal controls for prevention of
fraud, waste and abuse.
Chapter III is a historical review of the applicable
laws and circulars that established the requirements for the
Federal Government's programmed use of internal controls.
Chapter IV is a description and history of how the
Department of Defense executed the requirements of the
Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act through the
Headquarters Component level. Topics discussed are
responsibilities, written gu dance, vulnerability
assessments, management control reviews, the internal
control program's operational process, the Naval Audit
Service's review of the program, and the General Accounting
Office's analysis of the internal control program.
Chapter V addresses how a shipyard developed and
organized a local internal control program.
Chapter VI examines how the Internal Control Program
actually works and provides some evaluation on how the
actual operation reflects the design intended by the local
activity.
Chapter VII summarizes the conclusions and
recommendations supported by the field work.
II. INTERNAL CONTROLS OVERVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
Organizations, either profit or non-profit, consume
resources to achieve their objectives. Examples of these
resources include personnel, information and capital.
Resources are used in event cycles which are "groups of
related steps or actions within a program or function that
are held together by a significant beginning and ending
point." [Ref. 5:p. A. 3] Another term for an event cycle is
a system. Although resources are essential, they are also
scarce. Therefore, their consumption must be controlled.
This is the purpose of an internal control system.
This chapter will outline important definitions,
objectives, standards, risk and compliance testing as they
relate to the use of internal controls.
B. IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS
There are two definitions of internal controls relevant
to this discussion. The first definition is from the
Secretary of Defense's Internal Control Course .
Internal Controls are operational checks and balances that
prevent loss due to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement
of Government resources. Resources include: personnel,
information, and capital. [Ref. 5:p. 3]
The second definition comes from the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants
'
(AICPA) Statement On Auditing
Procedure 54 .
Internal control comprises the plan of organization and
all of the coordinate methods and measures adopted within
a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and
reliability of its accounting data, promote operational
efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed
managerial policies. This definition possibly is broader
than the meaning sometimes attributed to the term. It
recognizes that a "system" of internal control extends
beyond those matters which relate directly to the
functions of the accounting and financial departments.
[Ref. 6:p. 234]
The two definitions are similar in emphasis upon the
protection of assets or resources through the use of
internal controls. This is the basis for the Navy's
Internal Control Program [Ref. 3], and is also expressed in
the Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act of 1982 [Ref.
1]-
C. THE OBJECTIVES OF INTERNAL CONTROLS
Objectives are the desired outcomes of any internal
control system. There are two levels of objectives:
general and specific. Examples of general objectives, found
in the definitions cited in the previous section, are
safeguarding of assets or resources, promoting efficiency,
promoting the reliability of data, promoting adherence to
management's policies and preventing fraud, waste or abuse
in event cycles. These objectives are considered general
because they apply to any event cycle.
Specific objectives are developed from the general
objectives. They relate general objectives to specific
event cycles. For example, if a manager wants to safeguard
cash in the cafeteria system, he may determine a specific
objective to protect cash from theft during transportation
from a cash register to the bank. The general objective is
to safeguard an asset, and the specific objective is to
safeguard cash during the collection event cycle.
D. ELEMENTS OR STANDARDS OF INTERNAL CONTROL
Internal controls are based on general and specific
objectives. However, achieving those objectives depends on
the internal controls having certain characteristics that
cause them to operate in an effective manner. GAO has
called these characteristics standards [Ref. 9:p. 31], while
academicians often refer to these characteristics as
elements [Ref. 7:p. 273]. Regardless of terminology, the









(9) Separation of duties,
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(10) Adequate supervision,
(11) Security. [Ref. 8:pp. 31-36]
GAO recognizes the first five as general standards, and the
remaining six are considered a subset of control techniques
[Ref. 8:p. 30]. To gain an understanding of the general
versus the specific standards as recognized by GAO, the
following illustrates the relationship.
The general standards are the building blocks of an
effective control system. If one block is missing, then
the foundation will be incomplete. In other words, the
ideal control system will meet all of the general
standards. The specific standards apply to the control
techniques used in an assessable unit. Some assessable
units will not require control techniques in all of the
areas reflected in the specific standard. Therefore, some
specific standards may not be applicable to all assessable
units. [Ref. 8:p. 35]
The assessable units mentioned in the last quote are the
same as the event cycles discussed earlier [Ref. 5: p. A.l].
The general and specific standards are explained in




An internal control must provide the manager
with the confidence that he or she is able to understand the
methods employed by the internal control and that the
internal control, as he or she understands its operation,
reduces risk within an event cycle. [Ref. 8:p. 31]
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b. Supportive Attitude
An internal control often involves an
interaction between management and workers. This standard
places emphasis on the idea that an internal control works
only if it is supported by all parties involved. [Ref. 8:
p. 31]
c. Competent Personnel
An internal control requires that the personnel
involved in implementing that control have the knowledge and
skills necessary to understand their assigned tasks and to
support the internal control system. [Ref. 8: p. 32]
d. Control Objectives
Specific internal control objectives are
developed for each event cycle so that internal controls can
address the specific risks normally inherent in that event
cycle. The objectives are developed by management before
management develops its internal controls, because those
objectives are needed to provide an idea of what is to be
controlled within the event cycle. [Ref. 8: p. 32]
e. Control Techniques
Control techniques are the mechanisms by which
internal controls achieve general and specific objectives.
GAO calls these control techniques the specific standards of
internal controls [Ref. 8:p. 32]. Those standards are
explained in detail in the next section.
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2 . Specific Standards
a. Documentation
Documentation is a control technique that
provides an independent source of information that will
indicate if a transaction has been executed. Confirmation
of information is done by comparing documents to records and
other documents. To illustrate, tool issue documents are
compared against tool inventory records to detect unrecorded
issues. Use of this procedure in a tool room enables a
manager to detect if his procedures are being followed in
recording of tool issues. [Ref. 8:p. 33]
b. Records
Recording transactions accurately and on a
timely basis improves the reliability of records for audit
and review. Records are useful as internal controls because
they can be used to audit past transactions for problems or
errors. For example, in a tool room inventory records are
maintained to provide a history of receipts and issues. By
using documents or records each transaction recorded on
those inventory records can be checked for accuracy.
Without the inventory records, a history of past
transactions would not be available to detect actual or
potential errors. [Ref. 8:p. 33]
c. Authorization
In the execution of transactions, evidence is
maintained that all transactions are authorized by persons
13
acting within the scope of their authority. As part of the
authorization process, transactions are checked to ensure
that they conform to management's policies. To illustrate,
tools are issued only to personnel whose names appear on a
list authorized by the shipyard commander to use tools. An
approval signature from the tool room supervisor is required
before one worker can draw more than ten tools. [Ref. 8: p.
33]
d. Separation of Duties
Separation of duties means that one person is
not allowed to control an asset or resource completely. As
an example of this technique in a cash collection event
cycle, the person collecting cash is not the same person
keeping the accounting records; and the person keeping
accounting records is not allowed to make the daily cash
deposits to the bank. [Ref. 8:p. 33]
e. Adequate Supervision
To encourage workers to comply with management's
policies and procedures, supervision provides the necessary
guidance and visibility to prevent and correct errors.
Adequate supervision depends on having a supervisor who is
capable of assigning, reviewing and approving work. The
supervisor must also possess the knowledge to provide
training to subordinates. As an example, suppose an event
cycle involves performing extremely complicated surgical
procedures. Having a chief surgeon present when a new
14
intern is performing that individual's first operation would
be a good control. [Ref. 8:p. 34]
f. Security
Access to resources is a security issue. To
prevent unauthorized access to a resource, management can
use physical controls, such as locks, guards or fences; or
it can use administrative procedures to check on the
intended use of a resource and evaluate whether the resource
should be withheld to prevent misuse. An example of an
administrative security control is to have all requests for
classified material screened to see if the requestor has a
valid need for the information. [Ref. 8:p. 34]
E. THE ROLE OF RISK IN DETERMINING INTERNAL CONTROLS
Since fraud, waste and abuse are always potential
problems, a gauge of their impact is necessary to determine
the degree to which preventive steps must be taken. Risk
evaluation is a method for measuring the impact of those
potential problems. As a measure of the degree of potential
problems, risk can be defined in various terms, depending on
what management is trying to accomplish. According to the
Navy's Internal Control Program guidance, the only type of
risk used to evaluate event cycles is normally referred to
as inherent risk [Ref. 5: p. A. 3]. However, two types of
risk are addressed in the field work of this thesis. Those
two types are inherent risk and control risk [Ref. 7:p.
244]. The Navy guidance on internal controls considers
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control risk as part of the evaluation of the overall
inherent risk in event cycles [Ref. 8:pp. 31-47].
Inherent risk measures the manager's or auditor's
expectation that material errors exist in the event cycle,
before considering the effectiveness of internal controls.
Control risk measures the manager's or auditor's expectation
that material errors in an event cycle will not be prevented
or detected by the internal control system. [Ref. 7:p. 244]
Risk is not only an important management decision for
evaluating internal controls, but it is also a key aspect to
performing vulnerability assessments [Ref. 8:p. 3].
Vulnerability assessments are used as part of the Navy's
Internal Control Program and are discussed later.
Risk is usually evaluated on a scale from high to low.
But risk is not the only concern for managers. Internal
controls have a cost associated with their use. That cost
requires managers to consider how many internal controls
should be used to reduce risk in an event cycle. To make a
decision about the appropriate number of internal controls,
the manager considers what level of risk is acceptable. The
level of acceptable risk on a scale from high to low is
determined partly on the basis of another factor, known as
materiality [Ref. 7:p. 230]. Materiality is the relative
significance of some quantity. Thus, if a person had only
two dollars and lost one, that individual would consider the
loss to be material. However, if a person had $1 million
16
and lost one, that individual most likely would consider the
loss to be immaterial. Combining risk and materiality in
the following example will illustrate why both factors are
to be considered before implementing internal controls. In
printing two dollar advertisements for a newspaper, a
printer mistypes half of all advertisements daily. The risk
of printing errors is very high. However, the revenues
generated from selling two dollar advertisements represent
less than one percent of the entire revenues generated by
the newspaper on a single day. The cost of the errors to
the newspaper is immaterial . The newspaper manager knows
that, in order to lower the error rate, he must hire an
additional printer, whose daily salary would be more than
the revenues generated by the daily two dollar advertise-
ments. If a manager considers only risk and not
materiality, he or she may implement controls that are
effective but not efficient.
F. COMPLIANCE TESTING
Once internal controls are designed and put into
operation, they should be tested to ensure that they are
meeting the specific objectives [Ref. 7:p. 316]. This is
usually done through compliance testing. Compliance testing
can be done in these three ways: observation of the event
cycle to see if the internal controls are in place and
working, inquiry of the workers using the event cycle to see
if they understand and use the internal controls, and
17
examination of documentation to see if internal controls
were designed and have been used [Ref. 7:p. 77].
Compliance testing was important for this study because
it was used to determine if the internal controls
implemented by a shipyard manager were effective in
preventing identified weaknesses and if the internal
controls were used as claimed in reports to superiors.
An example of how compliance testing relates to internal
controls is presented in a simple shipyard event cycle.
Distribution of office supplies is an event cycle that
starts when a worker needs materials. The worker then goes
to a place where supplies are located and draws the
materials needed. At the point when the office supplies are
issued or drawn, the event cycle is completed until office
supplies are needed again. A manager notices that the use
of office supplies has gone from a minor expense, a few
hundred dollars a quarter, to a major expense of many
thousands of dollars. The manager knows from experience
that workload and personnel have not changed for many years.
This manager considers the change from a few hundred dollars
to a few thousand dollars to be a material difference.
After investigation of the event cycle, the manager is
unable to determine why there has been such a change in
office supply expenditures. The manager realizes that there
are no internal controls over the distribution of office
supplies. All of the employees have access to the storage
18
area, and there is no documentation supporting removal of
office supplies. One of management's general objectives is
to safeguard assets and resources, and in this case it was
not being done. The manager decides to implement some
internal controls. The specific objective is to control the
issue of office supplies in order to reduce expenditures.
The internal controls chosen are as follows:
(1) Lock up all office supplies,
(2) Appoint an office supplies custodian,
(3) Reguire all issues be documented by a reguisition,
and
(4) Reguire the custodian to record all issues daily on a
issue summary sheet and forward that record to the
manager.
After the internal controls were implemented, the
manager notices no change in the following guarter in
expenses for office supplies. The manager had not followed-
up on the internal control system to ensure that it was
working. When the manager finally investigated the new
system, the manager found that the custodian was leaving the
door unlocked during the day. Employees were going in and
getting whatever they wanted.
During the investigation of the problem the manager
performed compliance tests. First, the manager observed how
the office supplies were being issued. Then, the manager
asked the custodian if the door to the supply room was being
kept locked. Next, the manager asked other employees how
they got their supplies. Finally, the manager reviewed the
19
requisitions kept by the custodian and compared those
requisitions to the custodian's record summarizing daily
issues. By using compliance testing's simple methods of
inquiry, documentation and observation, the manager was able
to find out where the internal controls failed to operate.
The manager then decided to add one more control. The
manager planned to conduct surprise spot checks to see if
the supply room was being kept locked.
The previous example shows how compliance testing is
useful for determining if internal controls are in place and
working. During the field work for this study, this method
was used to check whether internal controls were actually
making changes within the shipyard.
20
III. THE HISTORY OF INTERNAL CONTROL
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter traces the history of internal controls
from their beginnings in the Federal Government through the
passage of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982. Of importance in this historical review is the
relationship between accountability and internal controls.
B. THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 1921
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 is significant
because it is the precursor to the Budget and Accounting
Procedures Act of 1950. It established several positions in
the Federal Government that would eventually be responsible
for enforcing the use of internal controls mandated by the
1950 act [Ref. 10:pp. 20-27]. The 1921 act was passed to
provide for a national budget system and for the independent
audit of government accounts by an independent office. The
independent office is the General Accounting Office (GAO)
,
headed by the Comptroller General of the United States. The
Federal audit function was removed from the Treasury and the
office of the Comptroller of the Treasury was abolished.
The budgeting function formerly performed by the Comptroller
of the Treasury was assigned to a new Bureau of the Budget.
This bureau would eventually become the Office of Management
21
and Budget in 197 0. Separation of the budget and accounting
functions is a significant event because it started to
formalize a basic element essential in any good internal
control system, the separation of duties. [Ref. 10: pp. 20-
23]
The key aspects of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
are the formalization of accounting documentation for audit
purposes and the reporting of financial information to the
Congress and the President for budgeting purposes [Ref. 10:
pp. 20-27]. Congress was concerned that the data necessary
for the Federal Government to budget accurately and then to
use appropriated funds efficiently were not being
maintained. Congress stated that the submission of budget
information by the President could not be evaluated
adequately, when the budget and accounting functions were
consolidated under the Treasury; so, they created the
General Accounting Office to be an independent check on the
executive branch of the government [Ref. 10:p. 23]. Within
its charter, the General Accounting Office is charged as
follows:
(a) The Comptroller General shall investigate, at the seat
of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the
receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds,
and shall make to the President when requested by him, and
to Congress at the beginning of each regular session, a
report in writing of the work of the General Accounting
Office, containing recommendations concerning the
legislation he may deem necessary to facilitate the prompt
and accurate rendition and settlement of accounts and
concerning such other matters relating to the receipt,
disbursement, and application of public funds as he may
think advisable. In such regular report, or in special
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reports at any time when Congress is in session, he shall
make recommendations looking to greater economy or
efficiency in public expenditures.
(b) He shall make such investigations and reports as shall
be ordered by either House of Congress or by any committee
of either House having jurisdiction over revenue,
appropriations, or expenditures. The Comptroller General
shall also, at the request of any such committee, direct
assistants from his office to furnish the committee such
aid and information as it may request.
(c) The Comptroller General shall specially report to
Congress every expenditure or contract made by any
department or establishment in any year in violation of
law.
(d) He shall submit to Congress reports upon the adequacy
and effectiveness of the administrative examination of
accounts and claims in the respective departments and
establishments and upon the adequacy and effectiveness of
departmental inspection of the offices and accounts of
fiscal officers.
(e) He shall furnish such information relating to
expenditures and accounting to the Bureau of the Budget as
it may request from time to time. [Ref. 10: pp. 20-27]
The Comptroller General performs the duties listed above
through internal audits, investigating all matters relating
to the use of public funds [Ref. 10:p. 25].
Internal audit is a function that addresses both the
accountability concerns of the Congress and the
effectiveness issue with respect to public resources.
Internal audit is a necessary part of the internal control
process because, without it, the ability of an auditor to
detect material errors is significantly reduced. The vast
size of the Federal Government makes audit of every
transaction expensive; therefore, the auditor must evaluate
the internal controls within its accounting systems.
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In summary, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
established formalized accounting systems, required internal
audit within executive agencies, established the Bureau of
the Budget, established an independent audit agency (GAO)
under the Comptroller General, separated the disbursement
and accounting functions within the executive branch of
government and was the first federal act to emphasize
adequacy and effectiveness of offices and accounts (internal
control)
.
C. THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES ACT OF 19 50
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 amended
the 1921 act and established the requirement to document
accounting systems used within the Federal Government.
While the 1921 act laid the foundations for internal control
systems within the Federal Government, it did not
specifically delineate the types of accounting systems nor
did it use the specific words "internal control." The
latitude and methods of execution were left to the
discretion of the executive agency heads. The only real
requirement for an accounting system's acceptance was to
pass the adequacy and efficiency tests of the Comptroller
General. The ever increasing size of the Federal
Government, especially after World War II, dictated that the
methods of communicating financial information be
standardized and integrated throughout the Federal
Government [Ref. ll:p. 835]. Congress was the defender of
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the purse and demanded better explanations for the executive
department's financial requests. Both the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 and the Budget and Accounting
Procedures Act of 1950 cited budgeting as the principal
concern that motivated passage of the Law.
Although budgeting was the primary interest, Congress
established that internal controls would make the budgeting
and expenditure of appropriated funds more effective [Ref.
ll:p. 836]. More definite guidance regarding internal
controls was provided in three areas. First the Bureau of
the Budget was directed to
...develop programs and to issue regulations and orders
for the improved gathering, compiling, analyzing,
publishing, and disseminating of statistical information
for any purpose by the various agencies in the executive
branch of the Government. [Ref. 11 :p. 8 34]
Second the Comptroller General was directed to coordinate
between the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of the
Treasury and establish an integrated and standardized
accounting system within the Federal Government. Finally,
the heads of executive agencies were required to
establish and maintain systems of accounting and internal
control designed to provide (1) full disclosure of
financial results of the agency's activities; (2) adequate
financial information needed for the agency's management
purposes; (3) effective control over and accountability
for all funds, property, and other assets for which the
agency is responsible, including appropriate internal
audit; (4) reliable accounting results to serve as the
basis for preparation and support of the agency's budget
request, for controlling the execution of its budget and
for providing financial information required by the Bureau
of the Budget under section 213 of the Budget and
Accounting Act, 1921. [Ref. ll:p. 836]
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This three pronged approach was to provide greater control
and better dissemination of financial information within the
Federal Government. [Ref. 11: p. 832]
Even though Congress had provided greater guidance
concerning accounting and the need to use internal controls,
latitude for the execution of those functions was still
vested in the executive agency heads and the Comptroller
General. The Comptroller General was directed to determine
the extent to which accounting and related financial
reporting exercised adequate financial control over
operations [Ref. ll:p. 835].
D. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 was Congress 1
first legislative action to establish the requirement for
maintaining a system of internal accounting controls. This
act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Public
companies were the target for this important legislation,
but the significance of its passage lies in the fact that
Congress acknowledged that internal controls could and
should be used for preventing abuses of an organization's
resources. [Ref. 12]
E. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
With the Carter Administration's promise to reduce the
size of the Federal Government, the pressure on Congress to
become more accountable, economical and efficient
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intensified. Congress desired a more active role in the
budget execution process and copied the lead taken by the
Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW). In 1977,
HEW was the first federal agency to establish an Inspector
General position. [Ref. 13]
Congress, by establishing the Office of the Inspector
General, could ensure that each agency had an independently
dedicated party to carry out the functions of internal
audit, investigation and control. Additionally, this
position would provide a focal point for compiling data to
report to Congress on the effective and efficient operation
of executive agencies. [Ref. 14]
Besides requiring the appointment of an Inspector
General, Congress went a step further to improve
accountability within the Department of Defense. Section 8
of the Inspector General Act required the Secretary of
Defense to take several actions. First, the Secretary was
required to submit semiannual reports to Congress on the
results of audit and investigations within the Department of
Defense. Next, he was required to make public disclosure of
audit results unless the results affected national security.
Additionally, Congress also required the Secretary of
Defense: (1) to submit proposed legislation to establish
appropriate reporting procedures concerning the audit,
investigative and inspection activities of the Department of
Defense, (2) to establish a task force to investigate ways
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to reduce fraud, waste and abuse, and (3) to issue a report
summarizing the Inspector General's ability to work
effectively and independently. [Ref. 14 :p. 1105]
The Inspector General of the Department of Defense was
not to become the head of each military department's
independent audit function. Each service secretary was
authorized to retain authority, direction and operational
control over his or her internal audit and internal review
organizations. For the Navy, the position responsible for
internal audit was the Auditor General. [Ref. 15:pp. 2-3]
F. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CIRCULAR A-12 3
The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) issued
Circular A-123 on 28 October 1981 as an attempt to move the
executive agencies toward compliance with the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. Circular A-123 reguired
agencies to: (1) establish directives on internal control,
(2) make assessments of an activity's inherent risk for
fraud, waste and abuse, and (3) develop a review schedule
for internal controls. [Ref. 16]
The significance of Circular A-123 lies in the fact that
this was the first Presidential sponsored document reguiring
the use of internal controls to combat fraud, waste and
abuse. Circular A-123 was later revised in 1983 to reflect
the changes caused by the Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Act of 1982 [Ref. 16]. It outlined the use of
28
vulnerability assessments and internal control reviews as
the basis for using internal controls within the Federal
Government
.
G. THE FEDERAL MANAGER'S FINANCIAL INTEGRITY ACT OF 1982
The Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act of 1982
(FMFIA) is the result of a combination of two bills that the
House of Representatives and the Senate tried to pass in
1980. They were the Financial Integrity Act of 1980 and the
Federal Manager's Accountability Act of 1980. [Ref. 17]
1. Details of Major Importance
Within this legislation, there are seven important
details that have brought internal controls to center stage
in combating fraud, waste and abuse. Each is discussed in
detail below.
a. Internal Accounting and Administrative Controls
Each executive agency is reguired to establish
internal accounting and administrative controls in
accordance with standards prescribed by the Comptroller
General and shall provide reasonable assurances that,
...obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable
laws; funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded
against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or
misappropriation; and revenues and expenditures applicable
to agency operations are properly recorded and accounted
for to permit the preparation of accounts and reliable
financial and statistical reports and to maintain
accountability over assets. [Ref. l:p. 814]
29
b. Evaluation Guidelines
The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, in consultation with the Comptroller General, shall
establish guidelines for agencies to follow to ensure their
internal accounting and administrative controls conform with
the intent of this act.
c. Compliance Statement
Annually, executive agency heads are required to
submit a statement of compliance or noncompliance in
relation to this act.
d. Report
Along with the annual compliance or noncompli-
ance statements, executive agency heads will prepare a
report that states exactly any material weaknesses in the
agency's systems of internal accounting and administrative
control. This report will also contain a detailed schedule
outlining the plan for corrective action.
e. Transmission of Statements and Reports
Each executive agency head will sign the
statements and reports and forward them to Congress and the
President. In addition, these reports will be made
available to the public upon request.
f. Appropriations
The President will submit with each budget, to
Congress, a detailed report explaining the funds requested
on behalf of the Office of the Inspector General.
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g. Agency's Accounting Systems
Each annual statement prepared shall include a
separate report on whether the agency's accounting system
conforms to the principles, standards and related




The Role of the Office of Management and Budget
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
is tasked with assisting the President by developing
efficient coordinating mechanisms to implement legislative
enactments. By so doing, the Director is responsible for
interpreting this act for other executive agencies to
follow. This act specifically identifies the Director by
title and it tasks that individual to take the appropriate
actions Congress felt were ignored by the Executive Branch
when the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 was
passed. [Ref. l:p. 814]
3 The Role of the Comptroller General
Congress tasked the Comptroller General in the
Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 to standardize and
integrate federal accounting systems and then to approve
those systems. In the 1982 act, Congress re-emphasized this
approval requirement and mandated that agencies seek out the
Comptroller General's approval. [Ref. l:p. 814]
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4.
The Role of the Inspector General
It appears that Congress clearly believed that the
Executive Branch was not providing sufficient resources to
the Offices of Inspectors General. By making the Executive
Branch detail budget submissions in this area, Congress
ensured that the Executive Branch allocated adequate
resources to allow the Inspector General to be free from the
power of the purse held by the entity being audited or
inspected. [Ref. l:p. 814]
5 Summary
The FMFIA is the most extensive attempt by Congress
to date to hold the government accountable to the people.
Internal controls and accounting systems were given
standards by which progress in these areas could be
measured. Reporting requirements made specific individuals
accountable for instituting adequate internal controls.
Internal controls have been made an important part of the
way the United States Government conducts business.
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IV. HISTORY OF INTERNAL CONTROLS WITHIN THE NAVY
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the evolution
of the internal control program within the Department of the
Navy from its start in 1982 through its current state of
operation in March of 1988. To accomplish this purpose,
there are five facets that are discussed to provide a
general description of how the FMFIA was implemented within
the Navy. Facet one describes the internal control program
guidance issued by the levels of command responsible for
complying with the requirements of FMFIA. Facets two and
three describe the importance of vulnerability assessments
and management control reviews, respectively, and their
relationships to the internal control program. Facet four
provides an overview of how facets two and three are
integrated into a process that forms the basis of the Navy's
Internal Control Program. Finally, facet five summarizes
the comments of the Naval Audit Service's latest review of
the internal control program.
B. INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM GUIDANCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
As discussed in Chapter III, the FMFIA required that
the Comptroller General prescribe internal control
standards, OMB establish internal control guidelines, audit
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findings be promptly resolved and Agency Heads certify and
report on the use of internal controls within their
respective agencies. It is with regard to those certifica-
tion and reporting reguirements that the SECDEF was assigned
responsibility by law for establishing the use of internal
controls [Ref. l:p. 814].
The SECDEF, as the focal point for providing those
certifications and reports, established the internal control
program when he signed the Department of Defense (DOD)
Directive 7040.6 on 24 March 1982. This implementing action
was done prior to passage of FMFIA. Actually, the internal
control program was started in response to an Executive
Order, OMB Circular A-123 [Ref. 17:p. 23]. On 16 July 1984,
DOD Directive 7040.6 was reissued as DOD Directive 5010.38.
The change from the 7 000 series to the 5000 series was made
to remove the guidance from SECDEF 1 s audit-related
directives and to change it to a series reserved for
internal review-related directives. This new directive
incorporated the specific changes brought about by the FMFIA
and the subseguently revised OMB Circular A-123 of 1983.
[Ref. 17:p. 23]
With the issuance of the original directive, SECDEF
directed each of the military services to establish internal
control programs within their departments. This initial
guidance was tailored from the OMB Circular A-123 issued in
October of 1981 and the OMB Guidelines published in December
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of 1982. Because of the relatively short time between the
passage of FMFIA and its required implementation, SECDEF did
not immediately provide training or instruction on how these
programs should be structured; the responsibility was left
completely to the service secretaries. The GAO on 1 May
1984 issued a report to the SECDEF that highlighted the
progress DOD had made toward implementation of FMFIA. [Ref.
18 :p. 1] Within that review, two significant problems were
highlighted. The first problem was that there was
insufficient training on the requirements of FMFIA. The
second problem emphasized that throughout the DOD
insufficient documentation was maintained concerning the
implementation of the internal control program. [Ref. 18 :p.
1] In August of 1984, SECDEF issued a training course that
was designed to correct the lack of training and adequate
documentation. [Ref. 19 :p. 1] This Internal Control Course
[Ref. 19] comprised three volumes and a cover letter.
With the directive and the training course issued,
the SECDEF left the operation of the internal control
program to the service secretaries except for overall
compilation of reports and certifications to Congress. The
remainder of this thesis deals with the internal control




2. The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
On 29 July 1983, SECNAV took his first formal action
to implement the requirements of FMFIA, OMB Circular A-123
and DOD Directive 7040.6 [Ref. 17:p. 23]. The result of
that action was SECNAV Instruction 5200.35. That
instruction became the basic policy guidance which started
the Navy's Internal Control Program, directed use of "OMB
Guidelines" for the evaluation, improvement and reporting of
internal control systems, and assigned specific actions
throughout the chain of command. [Ref. 3: pp. 1-4]
SECNAV Instruction 5200.35 has been updated only
once since 1983 and it is currently issued as SECNAV
Instruction 5200. 35A, dated 17 May 1985 [Ref. 20]. The
instruction was reissued so as to address three objectives
not specifically covered within the first instruction [Ref.
17:p. 24]. To summarize those reasons for change, the
original instruction did not adequately emphasize the needs
to:
(1) maintain effective operation and accounting control
systems,
(2) maintain involvement by all levels of management for
ensuring that effective controls exist, and
(3) maintain an adequate system to ensure that follow-up
actions are in place to promptly correct internal
control deficiencies. [Ref. 20]
Prior to the Comptroller of the Navy becoming the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management,
the original SECNAV instruction assigned the internal
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control program's project management to the Deputy Under
Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management. He was
supported in that function by the Comptroller of the Navy
[Ref. 3:p. 3]. SECNAV Instruction 5200. 35A, the revision of
the original SECNAV instruction, assigned the internal
control program's project management to the Under Secretary
of the Navy [Ref. 20:p. 2].
Currently, there is a draft revision to SECNAV
Instruction 5200. 35A that would shift the program management
responsibility entirely from the Deputy Under Secretary of
the Navy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management (NAVCOMPT) . Additionally, that
revision emphasizes the need to have all levels of the DON
comply with GAO standards and to involve all the levels of
management on an on-going basis in the process of
determining adequacy of internal controls. [Ref. 17 :p. 25]
3 . Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
Originally, the next echelon for implementation,
according to SECNAV Instruction 5200.35, was the
headquarters component level and NAVSEA was designated as
one of the original 26 so designated [Ref. 3]. However,
when the revised SECNAV Instruction 5200. 3 5A was issued in
1985, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) became the only
headquarters component beside the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to report on internal controls directly to NAVCOMPT.
Also, the revised instruction stated that the CNO was
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responsible for ensuring that all his subordinates complied
with the guidance within the revised SECNAV instruction
[Ref. 20:p. 2]. NAVSEA as a subordinate of the CNO reports
to NAVCOMPT through the CNO [Ref. 20: encl. 2].
On 6 January 1986, the CNO issued OPNAV Instruction
5200. 25A, applicable to all Naval activities. That
instruction contained information similar to SECNAV
Instruction 5200. 35A but had two requirements that were not
similar to the previously issued guidance. OPNAV
Instruction 5200. 25A identified a detailed inventory of
assessable units that were to be included periodically for
vulnerability assessments, and it identified CNO's demands
for specific reporting requirements. [Ref. 17 :p. 26]
NAVSEA, within five months of the CNO's issuance of
OPNAV Instruction 5200. 25A, issued NAVSEA Instruction
5200.13 [Ref. 22]. Under this specific guidance NAVSEA
provides the internal control program policy for the Navy's
eight active Naval Shipyards. This thesis focuses on the
internal control program implemented within one of those
eight shipyards. According to that shipyard's Director of
Internal Review, the shipyard commander identified NAVSEA
Instruction 52 00.13 as the most important guidance to be
followed for implementing the shipyard's internal control
program. Since NAVSEA Instruction 5200.13 is identified as
the most important guidance for the shipyard to use in
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developing an internal control program, the important parts
of that instruction are quoted below for future reference.
1. Performance Appraisals . The ability of personnel
assigned duties to develop, implement or maintain internal
controls or to perform Vulnerability Assessments or
Management Control Reviews should be evaluated in their
routine performance appraisals.
a. Military Personnel . The internal control program
does not reorient the current military fitness report or
performance evaluation process. Rather, the normal
appraisal process continues to review a military member's
performance in internal control as it has in the past.
For example, the Officer Appraisal Work Sheet, NAVPERS
Form 1611, evaluates numerous elements of internal
control. Internal control should be regarded as a normal
part of the management process for military personnel.
b. Civilian Personnel . Civilian personnel have
structured performance appraisal system. Supervisors
responsible for overseeing objective setting and
performance appraisals should ensure that the internal
control aspects of the functions being performed are
emphasized.
2. Quality Control . To ensure that the objectives of
this program are achieved, quality control shall be
exercised at all levels of command. Quality control will
include:
a. Ensuring appropriate internal control training is
provided.
b. Performing adequate Vulnerability Assessments and
Management Control Reviews.
c. Preparing accurate and timely reports.
d. Establishing a formal follow-up system for
monitoring corrective actions to material and/or systemic
deficiencies.
e. Establishing a system of testing corrective
actions to material or systemic deficiencies. No
deficiencies can be dropped from a follow-up system until
it has been tested (on-site review of the deficiency to
determine if the stated corrective actions solved the
deficiency)
.
f. Conducting periodic on-site reviews of Management
Control Review procedures at subordinate commands to




Vulnerability Assessments and Management Control
Reviews . Vulnerability Assessments and Management Control
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Reviews shall be conducted of assessable units covering
all programs and functions of the activity. An inventory
of assessable units shall be developed and maintained by
each activity. Vulnerability Assessments, Management
Control Reviews and Other Management Actions shall be
conducted and reported in accordance with this
instruction.
4 . Responsibilities
a. Office of Internal Review, COMNAVSEA (SEA 00F3)
will:
(1) Establish and maintain the command-wide
internal control program.
(2) Provide overall policy, procedures and
oversight of the command's internal control program.
(3) Coordinate, prepare and submit all reports
required for COMNAVSEA 's signature.
(4) Establish a Command training program.
(5) Maintain COMNAVSEA' s tracking system for
internal control evaluations and corrective actions.
(6) Establish and coordinate a quality assurance
program.
b. NAVSEA field activities, detachments and
headquarters deputy commanders will:
(1) Designate an internal control coordinator to
administer the program.
(2) Ensure internal control systems under their
purview (including classified systems) are implemented and
functioning.
(3) Ensure that managers (both military and
civilian) responsible for internal controls are identified
and their fitness reports and performance appraisals
reflect that responsibility.
(4) Perform vulnerability assessments, management
control reviews and other appropriate management actions
and report the results.
(5) Maintain documentation on all vulnerability
assessments, management control reviews, other management
actions and corrective actions.
(6) Establish quality control to ensure that
adequate internal controls are established to prevent loss
or unauthorized use of resources, errors in reports and
information, illegal or unethical acts, inefficiencies and
adverse public opinion.
c. Internal review offices will:
(1) Evaluate respective command compliance with
the requirements of this instruction.
(2) Perform selected audits and test checks of
internal control documentation and systems.
(3) Provide technical assistance to managers in
conducting reviews and assessments. (Internal review will
not conduct vulnerability assessments and management
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control reviews except in their own areas of
responsibility.
)
d. The NAVSEA Inspector General (SEA 00N) will:
(1) Include the implementation of the program as
a specific review item during Command Inspections. [Ref.
22:pp. 2-5]
C. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
The second facet of this discussion focuses on the first
of two critical processes essential to all internal control
programs utilized within the Navy—vulnerability assessment.
A vulnerability assessment is a management evaluation of a
program or function aimed at identifying the potential for
mismanagement, loss, fraud, or waste in that program or
function. The objective of these assessments is to attain
a ranking of all programs and functions within an
organization in terms of their susceptibility to loss or
unauthorized use of resources, errors in reports or
information, illegal or unethical acts and/or adverse or
unfavorable public opinion. This ranking process enables
management to determine priorities for conducting
management control reviews.
The vulnerability assessment process consists of: (1)
deciding which major programs/ functions are applicable to
the component; (2) determining what aspects of each major
program/ function are performed by the component; (3)
identifying responsible managers to perform the
assessments; (4) documenting the vulnerability factors;
(5) establishing ratings and rankings based on experience
and judgement; and (6) submitting a brief written report.
[Ref. 3: end. 1, p. 2]
The vulnerability assessment process was first required by
OMB Circular A-123 [Ref. 23]. Since that process was
designed to help managers logically assess the risk
potential within their organizations, it became an essential
part of all the internal control programs started within the
Navy [Ref. 3]. As stated earlier, the CNO in his 1986
instruction established a detailed inventory of assessable
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units and required that those units be assessed at a maximum
interval of every two years [Ref. 21]. In August of 1986,
when OMB revised its Circular A-12 3 in order to reduce the
internal control program paper workload, the CNO issued
interim guidance to reflect a change from the maximum two-
year requirement for performing vulnerability assessments to
a five-year requirement [Ref. 24]. Besides attempting to
reduce the paper workload, the vulnerability assessment
cycle was changed to provide management more time and
resources to conduct management control reviews [Ref. 24].
D. MANAGEMENT CONTROL REVIEWS
Management control reviews represent the second and most
critical process for having a good internal control program.
It should be considered the most critical process because it
is during this process that internal controls are corrected
or added to an event cycle to prevent fraud, waste or abuse.
Management control reviews (also referred to as internal
control reviews) are detailed examinations of a
program/ function to ensure internal controls exist, are
documented and are functioning as intended. These reviews
should identify weak, nonexistent or excessive controls
and initiate actions necessary to correct noted
deficiencies. Management control reviews are performed at
each DON command and activity by the managers responsible
for the system of internal controls under review.
The following steps provide a basic approach to performing
internal control reviews.
a. Identify "event cycles." These cycles are the
processes or series of events leading to accomplishment of
a function.
b. Analyze the general control environment; i.e.,
management attitude, organization structure, personnel,
delegation and communication of authority and
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responsibilities, budgeting and reporting practices and
organizational checks and balances.
c. Document event cycles. Documentation should be in
the form of flow charts or narrative explanations in
sufficient detail to permit an in-depth analysis of the
existence and adequacy of internal controls. At a
minimum, this documentation should identify procedures
used, personnel performing the procedures and forms or
other records used in executing the transactions. Also
internal control points in the event cycle should be
highlighted.
d. Identify needed controls for each transaction
cycle and compare them to existing controls to determine
nonexistent or unnecessary controls.
e. Test established controls to ensure they are
functioning as intended.
f. Report the results of the reviews. Identify
weaknesses and deficiencies in the internal control system
and recommend necessary corrective actions. [Ref. 3: end
1* P- 5]
E. THE INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM PROCESS
The internal control program process is similar
throughout all levels of command within the Navy. It is a
sequential process that works on a cyclical basis for
conducting the following seven steps:
(1) Organizing the process,
(2) Segmenting the activity,
(3) Conducting the vulnerability assessments,
(4) Developing plans for subsequent actions,
(5) Conducting management control reviews,
(6) Reporting the results of the internal control
process,
(7) Following up on corrective actions. [Ref. 2:p. I-
5].
Of the steps listed above, step one emphasizes the
assignment of overall coordination and reporting
43
responsibilities throughout a local activity's chain of
command. It is during this step that overall management of
the internal control program is assigned to one individual.
After a focal point is identified, that individual begins by
planning the remaining six steps with the activity commander
and the department heads. Step two of the internal control
process involves the person assigned overall management
responsi-bility and the department heads coming together to
identify how to segment the activity. The segmentation is
done to recognize which event cycles should be included on
the activity's list of assessable units. As described in
Chapter II, assessable units are also known as event cycles.
Next, department heads draw up the boundaries identifying
where a line manager's responsibility for conducting
vulnerability assessments and management control reviews
begin and end. Steps three and five were explained in depth
earlier in this chapter and step six was covered during the
explanation of FMFIA in Chapter III. [Ref. 21]
Steps four and seven are quite important and deserve
further explanation. Developing plans for subsequent
actions is important because it focuses management's
attention on the actions necessary to correct the potential
risks identified during vulnerability assessments. This
planning and scheduling allows management to coordinate the
function from a central location within its activity. After
the program was initially set up within DON, this step
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became the initial action for continuing the process on a
cyclical basis. Steps one and two were eliminated from the
process unless the activity was reorganized on a significant
scale. Finally, step seven indicates that follow-up is an
essential element in the overall process. This step is the
internal control inherent within the internal control
program process to ensure that the efforts of the program
are not lost by management's indifference. [Ref. 22]
While the process is similar throughout the Navy, the
schedule for taking action on the process is driven by
FMFIA's reporting requirements. Each command level within
the Navy modifies its reporting requirements to allow
sufficient time for SECDEF to compile his composite report
to the Congress. Since the field work for this thesis deals
with a Naval Shipyard, NAVSEA's reporting requirements and
time frames are listed below as a typical example:
(1) Results of Management Control Reviews and Reviews of
Other Management Actions (Annually)
,
(2) Internal Control Certification Statement (Annually)
,
(3) Consolidated Vulnerability Assessment Form (Every
Fifth Year)
,
(4) Updated Inventory of Assessable Units (Every Fifth
Year)
,
(5) Status of Corrective Actions (Semiannually) . [Ref.
22:encl. 3, p. 6]
NAVSEA last updated the above schedule in July of 1987 after
the CNO issued interim guidance on additional reporting
requirements [Ref. 24].
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F. INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM EVALUATION
Before turning in the next chapter to the results of an
on-site study of one Naval Shipyard, a summary of the Naval
Audit Service's latest evaluation is provided as an overview
for comparing the observations made at a local activity.
The Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC) is the internal
review function for SECNAV. Since passage of FMFIA,
NAVAUDSVC has been tasked with periodically reviewing the
Navy's implementation of the internal control program. To
date, NAVAUDSVC has issued three composite advisory reports,
the last report being issued on 24 August 1987 [Ref. 25].
That last report covers Navy-wide implementation progress
made through fiscal year 1986. Although that information is
dated by 18 months, Report T3 004 6, Implementation of the
Department of the Navy's Internal Control Program is the
latest opinion published by the NAVAUDSVC [Ref. 25].
Report T30046 had as its basic objectives to evaluate
the accuracy of the procedures used to identify and report
on material weaknesses, to determine if local commands had
adequate follow-up systems in place, to determine the status
of corrective actions from previous years, and to assess the
accuracy of the SECNAV s Internal Control Statement to
Congress [Ref. 25]. The report did not evaluate how the
Navy's Internal Control Program promoted conformity to GAO
standards and the general objectives of FMFIA. NAVAUDSVC
limited this latest audit to reviewing results of the
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implementing process [Ref. 25]. During that review, 28
major commands, including NAVSEA, were evaluated. Results
of NAVAUDSVC's audit were classified into two parts. Part
one covered findings from the previous audit, Report T30005
[Ref. 26] and part two covered the objectives of the latest
audit, Report T30046 [Ref. 25]. The major finding in part
one was that some of the 2 8 commands audited had not
established effective follow-up systems for monitoring
corrective actions. This failure was a repeat finding from
the first audit in 1984, Report T30254 [Ref. 27]. Findings
classified under part two were as follows: subordinate
commands did not consider all sources for identifying
material weakness, such as old audit reports or inspection
findings; the required certification statements on the
adequacy of internal controls forwarded up the chain of
command as feeder statements by local activities were
incomplete; follow-up systems were still ineffective or not
established; and the CNO was submitting command inspections
for operating forces instead of management control reviews.
Findings in parts one and two represent the major concerns
noted by the NAVAUDSVC on a Navy-wide basis. NAVSEA, while
included in those reports, was found to have an adequate
follow-up system and did not have any of the other major
deficiencies noted above. [Ref. 17: p. 43]
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V. AN INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM WITHIN
ONE NAVAL SHIPYARD
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO A SHIPYARD'S INTERNAL CONTROL
PROGRAM
This chapter describes an internal control program as
developed by a single Naval Shipyard. The time frame to be
described represents a period of six years from September
1982 through March 1988. Only one shipyard was studied and
may not be representative of all Naval Shipyards; however,
based on comparative accounting figures, the shipyard
selected for study is one of the top four in total revenues
and one of the top three in total labor hours utilized. All
accounting figures cited in this chapter and the next were
extracted from NAVSEA's Navy Industrial Fund Reports System
(NIFRS) report dated 2 February 1988. Descriptions
contained in this chapter are a combination of on-site
review of historical records, personal observations of the
shipyard organization and information obtained from
interviews with shipyard, NAVSEA and NAVAUDSVC personnel.
This chapter emphasizes the evolution, organizational
structure and internal control process used by the shipyard.
Individual internal control case studies are analyzed in
Chapter VI.
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B. AN EVOLUTION OF ONE SHIPYARD'S INTERNAL CONTROL
PROGRAM
As discussed in Chapter IV, the Navy did not officially
start its development of an internal control program until
SECNAV issued the first Navy guidance in July 1983. The
Naval Shipyard that was studied had no records concerning a
formal internal control program prior to that time as
confirmed by the Director of Internal Review. While no
formal internal control program existed prior to 1983, all
of the nine shipyard employees interviewed acknowledged that
internal controls were part of their existing accounting and
nonfinancial systems. Personnel who were employed at the
shipyard prior to FMFIA's passage attributed the responsi-
bility for monitoring the use of internal controls
exclusively to the internal review staff. The common belief
of all the line managers interviewed was that breakdowns in
internal controls were noted only when discovered by audits
or inspections or when circumstances in an operation
required management's attention. Prior to July 1983,
according to the Director of Internal Review, internal
controls were only considered as a management tool in
response to problems. There was no formal mechanism or
requirement that caused line managers to anticipate the
possibility of fraud, waste or abuse. The Director of
Internal Review said the anticipation of potential problems
was a strategic planning function done mostly by top level
management during budget formulation and execution.
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Through interviews with the Director of Internal Review
and the Internal Control Program Coordinator, along with
examination of historical records, it was determined that
the shipyard commander, in response to the July 1983 SECNAV
guidance, did at least three things to implement an internal
control program. First, he assigned responsibility for the
internal control program to personnel in the Management
Engineering Division. Duties were to be performed on a
collateral duty basis. There were no other shipyard full
time personnel or assets assigned to this function. The
second accomplishment by the shipyard commander was to
present a numerical summary of the corrective actions taken
in response to weaknesses identified by vulnerability
assessments and to provide a letter describing program
implementation as an input to SECNAV" s certification and
report to Congress in December of 1983. Verification of the
1983 input was possible only through a verbal confirmation
from personnel performing those duties because no records
from that period could be located. The third and final
action taken in 198 3 by the shipyard commander was to
require department heads to have their line managers support
the program's identified objectives. In 1984, there were
two advancements in the internal control program. As
described by the Director of Internal Review, the
Management Engineering Branch Director had obtained enough
cooperation from line managers to complete the first
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management control reviews based on the 1983 vulnerability
assessments and to report semiannually on schedule as
required. Confirmation for those actions was once again
obtained only verbally because local files contained no
documentation covering the internal control program for any
part of 1984.
As noted in the last chapter, GAO and the NAVAUDSVC had
reviewed DOD's Internal Control Program after the first year
following FMFIA's passage. Those reports noted a lack of
training and documentation concerning DOD's implementation
of the internal control program. A lack of any records on
the actions taken by the shipyard parallels those findings.
During 1985, the execution of the internal control
program remained under the guidance of the Management
Engineering Branch. The Director of Internal Review
recalled that an audit of the internal control program
during 1985 revealed that the program operated in the same
manner as it had during 1984. He stated that from his
perspective neither the quantity nor quality of actions
concerning the internal control program had changed from the
previous year's effort. However, there was one action taken
in 1985 by the shipyard commander concerning the Director of
Internal Review and his interface with the internal control
program. The Internal Review function was separated from
the Comptroller's Department. It was after this action that
the Director of Internal Review said his staff's actions
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concerning the audit of the internal control program became
more formal and extensive. The Director of Internal
Review's records concerning the shipyard's implementation
and execution begin with the shipyard commander's December
1985 report to NAVSEA. This report was the same semiannual
report that was to be forwarded up the chain of command so
that the SECDEF could report to Congress which event cycles
required internal controls and what actions the shipyard
took to implement needed internal controls. Also, this
report contained the shipyard commander's annual certifica-
tion statement to the CNO for inclusion in the SECDEF'
s
report to Congress on the adequacy of internal controls
within the DOD.
As discussed in Chapter IV, GAO and NAVAUDSVC completed
their reviews of DOD's implementation efforts in late 1984.
According to the NAVSEA Internal Control Coordinator, NAVSEA
in 1985 organized and began to execute quality assurance
checks on its shipyards ' internal control programs in
response to the GAO and NAVAUDSVC reviews. The NAVSEA
Internal Control Coordinator also stated that NAVSEA 's
quality assurance efforts began to affect the shipyard under
study in January of 1986. Continuing the historical
description, the NAVSEA Internal Control Coordinator stated
she visited the shipyard and made three recommendations to
improve the program's performance. The first recommendation
was that the shipyard should start retaining documentation
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on actions taken concerning the internal control program.
To aid the shipyard in this task, NAVSEA's Internal Control
Coordinator delivered the SECDEF 1984 Internal Control
Course and conducted on-site training for the internal
review staff and the Management Engineering Branch
personnel. The last two recommendations were that the
Internal Review Director be given responsibility for the
internal control program and that one person be assigned as
a full time coordinator for the program.
The Director of Internal Review confirmed that the
shipyard commander followed all of those recommendations
within one month's time. Shortly after this change in local
policy, the following actions were taken:
(1) The shipyard performed detailed vulnerability
assessments on 238 assessable units,
(2) The shipyard assigned 17 collateral-duty Departmental
Internal Control Coordinators,
(3) The shipyard drafted a shipyard instruction on the
internal control program,
(4) The shipyard conducted six complex management control
reviews,
(5) The shipyard conducted detailed training on the
Internal Control Course .
(6) The shipyard implemented 15 new internal controls.
According to the Director of Internal Review, the actions
taken in 1986 should be considered the first actions to
approach the requirements of FMFIA, because it was during
1986 that the shipyard completely employed all seven steps
involved in the internal control process. In his words,
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Without the proper documentation and the line manager's
involvement in the internal control program, it is
impossible in good faith to state that internal controls
are adequate.
The Director of Internal Review stated that the
improvement and expansion of the internal control program
continued in 1987 with nine additional management control
reviews being completed. The researcher's review of the
internal control program records confirmed that all reports
required by NAVSEA Instruction 5200.13 had been retained and
forwarded to NAVSEA. The researcher examined all retained
records concerning actions taken since January 1986 and
confirmed the Director of Internal Review's statement that
there were now adequate records for audit and review by
concerned parties external to the shipyard. The NAVAUDSVC
auditor also confirmed that the shipyard was retaining
better documentation after the 1986 reorganization. During
the records review, the researcher noted that 1987 was the
first year to have an annual internal control program
schedule on file. Further discussions with line managers
revealed that the Internal Control Coordinator followed the
schedule as part of the normal routine for the internal
control program.
The research for this thesis concluded in March of 1988.
Through that period the researcher was able to determine
through interviews that all previous actions that were
cyclical with regard to the internal control program were
continuing. Also, the researcher found out from interviews
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that the new improvements planned for the remainder of 1988
concerned a new schedule for vulnerability assessments,
issuance of a drafted internal control program instruction
and simplification of the supporting paperwork required by
the Navy's Internal Control Program.
C. THE SHIPYARD'S INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
As discussed earlier, local commanders are required to
implement an effective system for monitoring and ensuring
that good internal controls are used within their
organizations. The shipyard commander has the overall
responsibility for his internal control program. To support
him, there are organizations internal and external to the
shipyard that assist in the execution of the requirements of
FMFIA. Internally, according to the local shipyard draft
instruction and NAVSEA Instruction 5200.13, he is supported
by the Internal Review Department, the Internal Control
Program Coordinator, the Director of Industrial Relations,
department heads and line managers [Ref. 22]. Externally,
he is assisted by NAVAUDSVC's local shipyard on-site
auditors [Ref. 3].
The principal working relationship necessary for the
internal control program to function effectively is the
interface between the shipyard commander and the Director of
Internal Review [Ref. 22]. According to the Director of
Internal Review, that interface is both frequent and
mutually supportive. When the shipyard commander assigned
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the Director of Internal Review the responsibility for
program execution, he gave the Director a full time civil
servant, an increased budget and the authority to develop
policy for the shipyard's overall program execution. When
asked by the researcher, the Director of Internal Review
emphasized that the lines of communication between the
shipyard commander and himself were both open and direct.
The next participant in the program is the Director of
Industrial Relations. He is designated to assist managers
and supervisors in developing Internal Control elements
within employee performance appraisals. That action, as
stated by the Director of Internal Review, is intended to
provide the incentive for all civilian employees to
cooperate with the requirements of the program.
During the researcher's interview with the Internal
Control Program Coordinator, the facts that the Internal
Control Program Coordinator was hired in 1986 and is a
Management Analyst, GS-12, indicated when and what
capabilities the shipyard commander agreed were required to
manage the internal control program. As obtained from the
shipyard's organizational chart, the Internal Control
Program Coordinator was assigned to the Director of Internal
Review. The Director of Internal Review stated that the
Internal Control Program Coordinator is provided support
from the Internal Review Staff for the purposes of
scheduling, auditing and report compilation. According to
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the Internal Control Program Coordinator's position
description, he is assigned the primary responsibility for
coordinating the internal control process. Although
responsible for coordination, the Internal Control Program
Coordinator does not interface directly with department
heads. Coordination for the program at that organizational
level is between department heads and the Director of
Internal Review. In the draft internal control program
instruction and as described by the Director of Internal
Review, department heads are required by the shipyard
commander to appoint departmental representatives to assist
the Internal Control Program Coordinator and to ensure that
the department heads take an active interest in the internal
control process. As part of that process, department heads
encourage and evaluate their line managers' cooperation with
both the Departmental Internal Control Coordinator and the
Internal Control Program Coordinator [Ref. 22].
At the line manager's level of authority, internal
controls are evaluated, developed, improved and sometimes
eliminated so as to prevent fraud, waste and abuse. It is
the line managers who should provide the primary efforts
necessary to ensure the program's success or failure. [Ref.
5:p. 7]
All the relationships described above are internal to
the shipyard's organization. An organization external to
the shipyard is the NAVAUDSVC. The NAVAUDSVC has auditors
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permanently stationed at all eight Naval Shipyards, and
perform audits on a continuing basis. As part of their
responsibilities, auditors evaluate the effectiveness of
internal controls. As those evaluations take place, the
auditor provides recommendations to shipyard personnel on
how systems or operations can be improved. Recommendations
from the auditors assist the local line manager in
developing the correct control to fix actual or potential
problems. According to the NAVAUDSVC auditor interviewed,
the Auditor General of the Navy has a policy that the Navy's
Internal Control Program is to be an integral part of their
daily work.
In summary, the shipyard's organization executes its
program by delegating authority down to the Director of
Internal Review who acts both laterally and vertically to
execute the program. The Director of Internal Review's
principal focal point for implementation is the Internal
Control Program Coordinator. The Internal Control Program
Coordinator then accesses line managers through departmental
internal control program coordinators. The burden for
taking corrective action rests primarily with the line
managers who are expected to coordinate their actions with
the overall internal control program [Ref. 22: end. 3, p.
4].
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D. HOW THE SHIPYARD USES THE INTERNAL CONTROL PROCESS
In Chapter IV, a seven step process was identified as
the basic structure around which shipyards should form their
internal control program. The shipyard in this study was
found by the researcher to be utilizing that basic process.
In this section, the shipyard's execution of that process is
expanded upon to show how that process was tailored to fit
the needs and desires of the shipyard commander. The
discussion that follows in this section was developed by the
researcher from interviews with the Director of Internal
Review and the Internal Control Program Coordinator.
The first step in the internal control process was the
organizing stage. In most cases this step should have been
a one-time evolution if the internal control program was
meeting the basic requirements identified in NAVSEA
Instruction 5200.13 for an effective internal control
program. But, the shipyard was required to undertake that
step twice, once in 198 3 when the program started and once
again in 1986 after NAVSEA suggested that the internal
control program be improved. The reorganization of the
internal control program moved the program's responsibili-
ties from the Management Engineering Branch to the Director
of Internal Review. Also, reorganization provided the first
opportunity to conduct necessary training through the use of
the Navy's Internal Control Course . After conducting the
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training, the shipyard was able to start maintaining records
in accordance with NAVSEA Instruction 52 00.13.
The next step in the internal control process was the
segmentation of the shipyard into assessable units. That
step was accomplished on at least three separate occasions,
according to the Director of Internal Review, first in 1984,
again in 1986 and finally again in 1987. Normally, the
segmentation of the activity should be required only once.
But in this case it occurred three times because, with each
successive attempt the segmentation became more detailed.
These facts were verified by the researcher's examination of
the records retained after 1986. Those records contain
correspondence between the shipyard commander and NAVSEA
that explained the three attempts the shipyard made at
updating its assessable units inventory. The Director of
Internal Review explained to the researcher that he had
found, that through greater segmentation of the assessable
units, more line managers became involved in the program.
Greater segmentation meant that, instead of line managers
looking at a large event cycle, such as the supply function
for the shipyard, they were required to break it down into
smaller event cylces. Examples of smaller supply functions
are event cycles like the material recieving process, the
imprest fund process, the open purchase process. It was the
Director of Internal Review's contention that as segmenta-
tion increased, greater numbers of line managers became
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involved in the management control review process. With
more line managers involved, event cycles could be more
closely assessed for weaknesses and then those event cycles
could be more easily corrected.
Step three, the vulnerability assessment step, had
occurred twice since the program's inception. In 1984, only
broad areas were assessed and only a handful of event cycles
were found to have material weaknesses, according to the
Director of Internal Review. After the 1986 reassessment,
greater potential errors were discovered, as documented in
the shipyard's semiannual report to NAVSEA. This increase
in potential errors was not due to any specific decline in
shipyard's performance but, according to the Director of
Internal Review, the increase was caused by the improved
efforts in assessing the segmented areas. After the 1986
vulnerability assessments and early in 1987, the shipyard
commander issued a local notice advising line managers that
in addition to the those assessments, potential future
management control reviews would also be scheduled based on
four additional inputs to the annual internal control
program schedule. These additional inputs, according the
shipyard commander's notice, were shipyard commander
requests, findings from internal reviews, findings from
NAVAUDSVC audit reports and CNO interest items.
The fourth step in the internal control process was
developing plans for subsequent actions. According to the
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Internal Control Program Coordinator, the shipyard performed
this step on a semiannual basis starting in January of 1987.
Prior to each semiannual report to NAVSEA, the Internal
Control Program Coordinator said he updated the shipyard
commander's annual internal control program schedule. He
considered the following questions about the local program:
(1) How many vulnerability assessments require a
management control review?
(2) How many audit findings need a management control
review?
(3) How many new CNO interest items need a management
control review?
(4) What previous actions identified by a management
control review need to be completed?
(5) When should training for departmental coordinators be
conducted?
(6) When should line managers conduct management control
reviews?
(7) When should the Internal Review Staff conduct audits
of management control reviews?
During this scheduling and planning process, the Internal
Control Program Coordinator explained, he also conducted his
follow-up of the internal control program. The researcher
checked on this planning and follow-up process by inquiry of
the Director of Internal Review and the six line managers
interviewed during the field work conducted in March of
1988.
Step five of the internal control process was the
execution of management control reviews. At the shipyard,
this step was performed on a continuing basis and was not an
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evolution limited to a particular point in time. The reason
for extending the process was because complexity of
evaluating, designing and implementing new internal controls
required managers to spread the workload over time to fit
their schedules, according to the Internal Control Program
Coordinator. He would interface with line managers daily in
some cases to help with the management control reviews. The
line managers interviewed by the researcher confirmed that
practice.
Step six in the internal control process concerned the
reports and annual certification forwarded to NAVSEA. The
files on hand after 1986 were complete and detailed when
compared by the researcher to the standards outlined in
NAVSEA Instruction 5200.13 [Ref. 22].
Step seven is the follow-up on corrective actions. The
Internal Control Program Coordinator said he used the
semiannual reports as his basis for conducting follow-ups
and asking the Internal Review Staff to review management
control reviews completed during the preceding six month
period. As already mentioned, follow-up occurred prior to
each semiannual report and involved the Coordinator,
Internal Review Staff, line managers and, in some cases,
both the Director of Internal Review and department heads.
While the Director of Internal Review and the Coordinator
insisted that follow-up actions were thorough, there was at
least one case found during the field work where follow-up
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was not aggressive enough to prevent the automated data
processing functions from falling behind in taking
corrective actions by at least one year.
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VI. AN EVALUATION OF THE SHIPYARD'S
INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM
A. OVERVIEW
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the
implementation and execution of the Navy's Internal Control
Program at the local activity level. Chapter V described
the implementation and some of the unique circumstances that
caused the shipyard to develop its internal control program.
This chapter describes and evaluates the execution of the
internal control program. A combination of three approaches
was used to examine the execution of the shipyard's program.
Approach number one was designed to obtain impressions
from four key participants who had either oversight or
management responsibilities. To obtain this general
impression, two of the persons interviewed were external to
the shipyard's organization and two of the persons
interviewed were internal to the shipyard's organization.
The two external persons interviewed were the on-site Naval
Audit Service Auditor and the NAVSEA Internal Control
Coordinator. The two internal persons were the Director of
Internal Review and the shipyard Internal Control Program
Coordinator.
Approach number two for evaluating the internal control
program's execution was to compare the requirements
mandated by NAVSEA against the actions taken by the shipyard
65
for program implementation. The third and final approach
was to describe six case studies of specific examples where
internal controls were added to prevent potential errors or
correct actual problems. The descriptions contain
evaluations of the use of the internal control process and
point out where the controls succeeded or failed.
All of the results identified within this chapter were
obtained through an on-site examination of operations or
records and by conducting person-to-person interviews.
Facts and figures were obtained from the NIFRS report, a
monthly summary of all eight Naval Shipyard's financial and
management accounting reports, and from the shipyard's
historical records retained since 1982.
B. FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON HOW THE SHIPYARD EXECUTES THE
INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM
1 . NAVSEA's Internal Control Coordinator Comments
The NAVSEA Internal Control Coordinator's comments
apply to all the Naval Shipyards and do not reflect only the
circumstances existing within the one shipyard studied.
NAVSEA's program coordinator said that the shipyards'
internal control programs are supportive of the overall
goals set by NAVSEA. However, the implementation of the
program has been slower than NAVSEA initially expected.
According to the NAVSEA Internal Control Coordinator, the
most beneficial accomplishment of the internal control
program is that it lessens the burden on the shipyard
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internal review staffs for detecting potential errors in all
shipyard functions. The program has put that responsibility
on the line managers and has increased both the coverage and
the freguency of management control reviews. While NAVSEA's
Coordinator said that the program is beneficial, she notes
that the program is at times far too paperwork intensive.
Because of the complexity of maintaining records and
documenting actions taken, there is a reluctance by the
shipyard personnel to use the internal control process
extensively.
One of the more important aspects of a shipyard's
internal control program is the freedom to investigate
potential problems by local management and plan the
necessary corrective actions. The NAVSEA Internal Control
Coordinator said that in some instances, when shipyard
commanders had identified potential or actual problems in
their semiannual reports, those reports became a basis for
criticizing shipyard operations. The identification of
problems in too great a detail had invited micro-management
from above the shipyard commander's level of authority. The
NAVSEA Internal Control Coordinator said that, although that
practice had only happened in one or two isolated cases
during the early years of the Program's implementation, the
impact of that practice caused greater care to be taken by
shipyard commanders as to how and what problems were
identified to higher authorities.
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The NAVSEA Internal Control Program Coordinator
explained that the shipyard commanders increased concern
over the reporting requirement had two specific beneficial
results. First, it eliminated the attempt by shipyard
commanders to identify small or insignificant details that
should have been handled locally. Second, it encouraged
shipyard commanders to scrutinize more closely the content
of the actions being submitted by line managers for the
semiannual reports.
2 . NAVAUDSVC Auditor Comments
The second external impression of the shipyard's
execution of internal controls was obtained from an
interview with the shipyard's on-site NAVAUDSVC Auditor.
This auditor had an in-depth knowledge of this shipyard
because he had been assigned to it since the passage of
FMFIA. His tenure at that shipyard gave him the ability to
evaluate the program's implementation over its entire
history.
From the auditors 's perspective, the program has
several benefits and at least two major weaknesses. The
benefits are these:
(1) Shipyard personnel and line managers support the
internal control program.
(2) Internal controls are more widely used to prevent
potential errors.
(3) The shipyard's internal review staff and the
NAVAUDSVC auditor more frequently coordinated their
efforts concerning the evaluation of internal
controls in audits.
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(4) The most significant benefit is that the Internal
Control Program causes shipyard managers to become
more aware of their functions and how they operate
with regard to potential or real material weaknesses.
While the NAVAUDSVC auditor sees several benefits, he
believes that the program is not as successful as it should
be at combating fraud, waste and abuse. There are currently
two significant problems. The first is that local managers
focus too much of their management control review effort on
reviews specifically mandated by the CNO. The second is
that the follow-up efforts on newly implemented controls are
insufficient in most cases to make long lasting changes.
The NAVAUDSVC auditor believes that, if the follow-up aspect
were emphasized, more the program could be a more effective
management tool.
Having presented these two external views on the
shipyard's internal control program, two internal
perspectives are also provided to balance the overall
impression about how the program was executed.
3 . Director of Internal Review Comments
The first internal perspective was obtained from the
Director of Internal Review. His general comments indicate
that the program's biggest problems are twofold. The first
problem is that the process requires too much paperwork,
which tends to inhibit responsiveness from the line
managers. Secondly, the shipyard is highly decentralized
and production-oriented. Both circumstances work against
the idea of a centrally managed internal control process.
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Because of the decentralized nature of the shipyard's
organization, attempts at improving event cycles that cross
lines of authority are far too difficult and time consuming
for a single line manager. To provide the coordination
necessary to correct the complex event cycle's problems, one
or more line managers would need to be taken away from their
primary production goals. When the internal control program
runs counter to those production goals, line managers accord
compliance with the program a lower priority for accomplish-
ment. Although the Director of Internal Review recognizes
that situation, he summarizes command support to overcome
that situation as follows:
The Office of Internal Review has a very supportive
relationship with the current shipyard commander. The
shipyard commander has depended on the Internal Review
Organization for being the lead in the internal controls
area and has provided the necessary tools and muscle to
achieve this goal. As in any relationship, this remains a
two way street. He has recognized the positive actions
taken by the participants in this program by giving us and
them more responsibility.
The Director of Internal Review stated it was his
responsibility to monitor the overall efforts of the
internal control program and to maximize its use. He noted
that the shipyard's internal control program was to be
conducted by the line managers without providing them
additional time or personnel assets. The costs of executing
the Program were absorbed within the shipyard's overhead
costs.
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4 . Internal Control Program Coordinator Comments
As a final perspective, the views of the Internal
Control Program Coordinator, who is the manager most closely
associated with the internal control program, stated that
since 1986 the shipyard has made significant improvements in
documentation, training and control. Those accomplishments
were made possible only through the strong support given by
the shipyard commander and the Director of Internal Review.
Line managers are becoming more effective at identifying
problems and designing controls. However, two areas still
require further improvements to make the program manageable.
The first area concerns further attempts to streamline the
paperwork involved in the process. The second area concerns
the need for a more effective follow-up procedure. The
Internal Control Program Coordinator believes that it is
most difficult to convince managers that the process is only
effective if it is coupled with a strong follow-up
procedure.
C. HOW THE SHIPYARD MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NAVY'S
INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM
Approach number two compares the shipyard's execution of
the internal control program with the requirements mandated
by SECNAV, CNO and NAVSEA. As may be recalled from Chapter
IV. B. 3, there are at least six basic requirements that
should be followed in executing a good internal control
program [Ref. 22]. The following descriptions provide a
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The shipyard is to designate an Internal Control
Program Coordinator. The shipyard performed this function
twice, once in 1983 on a collateral duty basis and again
during the 1986 reorganization of the program.
2 Requirement Number Two
The shipyard is to ensure that an internal control
system is implemented and functioning. This requirement was
accomplished by drafting a shipyard internal control program
instruction and by continuously performing the seven steps
of the internal control process identified in Chapter IV. E.
3 Requirement Number Three
The shipyard is to ensure that both military and
civilian personnel have their responsibilities regarding
internal controls documented within their evaluations and
performance appraisals. According to the December 31, 1985
report to NAVSEA, the shipyard was achieving this goal for
only 36 percent of its line managers. The Director of
Internal Review knew of no further improvement concerning
this requirement since that 1985 report. Subsequent audits
of the Program confirmed the Director's belief about the




The shipyard is to ensure that vulnerability
assessments, management control reviews and other
appropriate management actions are performed and reported.
A review of the historical records revealed that in the
early years of the program those efforts were minimal.
Prior to 1986 the shipyard conducted approximately 37
vulnerability assessments and only 24 management control
reviews. After 1986, the shipyard conducted approximately
250 vulnerability assessments and 77 management control
reviews.
5 Requirement Number Five
The shipyard is to maintain documentation on all
vulnerability assessments, management control reviews, other
management actions and corrective actions. All the required
documentation was being maintained after the 1986
reorganization. The additional management actions included
correspondence on required reports, annual schedules,
periodic training, updates on actions taken and historical
files of vulnerability assessments and management control
reviews.
6 Requirement Number Six
The shipyard is to establish quality control to
ensure that adequate internal controls are in place to
prevent loss or unauthorized access to resources, prevent
errors in reports and information, prevent illegal or
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unethical acts and to prevent inefficiencies and adverse
public opinion. Under this requirement, the shipyard's line
managers believed that the Internal Review Staff and
Internal Control Program Coordinator were to perform the
quality control function. However, this quality control
review requirement was designated by NAVSEA to be a
shipyard-wide requirement and not an internal review
requirement. The internal review function was given its own
detailed responsibilities to evaluate overall program
compliance, to audit internal control documentation and
systems and to provide technical assistance to managers
conducting vulnerability assessments and management control
reviews [Ref. 22]. At the time of this field work, there
was no internal procedure that required managers to follow-
up on internal control actions taken. While interviewing
the Director of Internal Review, it was discovered that
there were no surprise audits or spot checks performed on an
unannounced basis to encourage compliance with the newly
implemented controls.
D. SIX EXAMPLES OF HOW THE INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM
WAS USED TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN SHIPYARD OPERATIONS
1. Case Study Format
The third phase of this examination of the execution
of a shipyard's internal control program uses six case
studies. All information in these six case studies was
obtained through on-site observation or examination of
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records, facilities and personnel preforming the functions
described. Accounting data cited were obtained from the
February 1988 NIFRS report and locally prepared operating
statements. Operating procedures evaluated were matched
against local instructions governing those procedures.
Since the exact shipyard selected for examination and
evaluation is not specifically identified to maintain
confidentiality, local instructions are not cited by name
or number. Navy-wide guidance concerning a function
involved in any of the following case studies is identified.
All six case studies were conducted in the same manner,
using a standard format. The format was designed by the
researcher to provide a consistent approach for drawing
conclusions later. The basic format for the six studies is
as follows:
(1) Background. This section describes the general
working environment of the function being studied to
indicate how the function impacts on shipyard
operations.
(2) Event Cycle. This section describes the systematic
steps involved in the function in which a weakness
was identified.
(3) Finding. This section describes a material weakness
discovered by the line manager of the event cycle
being described.
(4) The Controls Used To Prevent Potential Errors. This
section describes the controls the shipyard line
manager implemented to prevent the deficiency noted
in a finding.
(5) Compliance Testing. This section describes the
compliance testing performed by the researcher to
determine how well the newly implemented internal
controls were working.
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(6) Risk Assessment. This section describes how the
researcher evaluated risk in the event cycle after
the line manager implemented the new internal
controls. Risk is described by using two
classifications, inherent risk and control risk.
Inherent risk measures the researcher's expectation
that material errors may exist in the event cycle
before considering the effectiveness of internal
controls. Control risk measures the researcher's
expectation that material errors in the event cycle
will not be prevented or detected by the internal
controls
.
(7) Weaknesses With The System In Place. This section
describes additional weaknesses discovered by the
researcher after the event cycle was corrected by the
shipyard's line manager.
(8) Management's Commitment Rating. This section
describes how the line manager of the event cycle
being studied was rated by using a standardized
questionnaire (Appendix) designed by this researcher.
2 . Case A--Blanket Purchase Agreement Function
a. Background
The Blanket Purchase Agreement Function is a
Supply Department activity performed within the Purchase
Division, Code 530. There are five blanket purchase
agreement agents assigned to handle 350 indefinite delivery
contracts. The Naval Shipyard uses this type of contract
for approximately 40 percent of its annual purchase
requirements. Total expenditures for shipyard purchases is
approximately $33 million annually, of which $13.2 million
is expended by using indefinite delivery contracts. Open
purchase requirements are received from the Naval Shipyard,
Naval Base and tenant activities to support a primary
mission of ship repair and overhaul.
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b. Event Cycle
The blanket purchase agreement function begins
with a customer's request for non-standard material or
supplies. If the non-standard request can be provided by an
established indefinite delivery contract, the request is
forwarded to one of five blanket purchase agreement agents
for processing. The agent is authorized in writing to place
a verbal order with an approved vendor for the materials
requested. The blanket purchase agreement agent directs the
vendor to deliver a specified quantity to the customer.
Prior to placing an verbal or written order, the agent is
required to ensure that the original request has the
critical elements necessary to authorize the placement of
that order. Examples of the required elements are proper
technical review, appropriate funding, adequate descriptions
of the requested items, requisition numbers and any other
key elements required by the Naval Supply Acquisition
Regulation Supplement [Ref. 28:sec. 16.5, pp. 1-5]. The
receipt for material and the ultimate payment for that
material is done separately from the ordering function.
Therefore, this event cycle ends with the agent's forwarding
of the order to the Comptroller for payment. The
Comptroller will pay the vendor upon receipt of a
"confirmation of material receipt" from the customer
authorized to receive and accept that material.
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c. Finding
During a management control review in Fiscal
Year 1986, the line manager identified the fact, that if
competent personnel were not functioning as blanket purchase
agreement agents, the authorization function fulfilled by
this cycle would be in jeopardy of failure. Additionally,
it was noted that agents were not appointed in writing.
This control was designed by the Director of the Purchasing
Division to limit the persons authorized to place verbal
orders against indefinite delivery contracts. Without this
control, the chance of an unauthorized purchase was greatly
increased.
d. The Controls Used to Prevent Potential Errors
There were two controls identified by the
Director of the Purchasing Division to ensure that the
mandatory policies for contracting described in the Naval
Supply Acquisition Regulation Supplement [Ref. 28:sec. 16.5,
pp. 1-5] were met. The two requirements were that all
persons placing verbal orders against blanket purchase
agreements be appointed in writing and that all purchasing
agents will attend formal Navy training for contracting.
Control number one was an administrative control
to have one blanket purchase agreement agent attend the
Naval Supply System's approved Small Purchase Course and to
have four blanket purchase agreement agents attend the Small
Purchase Refresher Course.
78
Control number two was to authorize all blanket
purchase agreement agents in writing to place verbal orders.
e. Compliance Testing
Since the target date for implementing the
training control was dependent upon the availability of
training quotas, the Director of the Purchasing Division was
waiting for the quotas to become available in July 1988.
This delay prevented the researcher from performing
compliance tests of the first control during the March 1988
field work. Although compliance testing for the first
control was impossible, an investigation into the interim
actions taken by the line manager was considered an
appropriate alternative to evaluate the program's impact. A
review of the system in place revealed that all blanket
purchase agreement agents had more than one year's
contracting experience and they all had been given local
training on the applicable regulations. Additionally, all
agents were routinely supervised by an appointed Contracting
Officer. Compliance testing of the second control was
accomplished by asking the line manager if the agents had
been authorized in writing to place verbal orders.
f. Risk Assessment
The inherent risk for this event cycle is high
because the complexity of purchasing materials from the open
market is great. The requirements to authorize the
placement of an order is a very detailed process outlined in
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the Naval Supply Acquisition Regulation Supplement [Ref. 28:
sec. 16.5, pp. 3-5]. This process is further complicated by
the wide variety of materials requested in these non-
standard purchase requests. The dollar value for these
materials can range from small amounts to hundreds and even
thousands of dollars. Since blanket purchase agreement
agents are not experts in all the applicable areas relating
to procurement of non-standard material, a heavy reliance is
placed on the following of published guidance. The control
risk is considered low in this case because the control is
only an administrative control designed to comply with the
Navy regulations. The Navy regulation allows the option to
have customers place verbal orders directly with vendors.
However, the shipyard segregated the receipt function from
the ordering function by having blanket purchase agreement
agents place all verbal orders.
g. Weaknesses with the System in Place
The field work review of this system revealed no
other potential or existing weaknesses.
h. Management's Commitment Rating
A commitment rating was given to the line
manager based on the results of a standardized interview
(Appendix) . All six line managers from the selected
shipyard were interviewed using the questionnaire in the
Appendix. The interview questionnaire was designed to ask
questions that would indicate knowledge of the Internal
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Review Program, use of the program, coordination with other
affected personnel and attitude toward the use of internal
controls. The line manager responsible for the blanket
purchase agreement function was the only participant to
receive a score of 100 percent. This means that he (or she)
gave what the researcher regarded as the "right" answer to
all of the 31 questions in the interview questionnaire.
3 . Case B—Imprest Fund Function
a. Background
The imprest fund function is a Supply Department
activity found within the Purchasing Division, Code 530.
Imprest fund purchasing provides a simplified and economical
way to purchase non-standard materials or supplies. The use
of this method was limited to purchases not in excess of
$500 per transaction. As a reimbursable cash fund, the
imprest fund cashier was authorized to retain $10,000 as
working capital. The cashier was also authorized to have an
alternate cashier who retained part of the $10,000 to
provide workload relief. A turnover rate of 3.4 times per
month was the velocity of the cash requested and disbursed
to meet cash on delivery requests. That turnover rate
equated to a dollar volume of $30.4 thousand per month. Of
the $33 million in annual open purchase business, the
imprest fund accounted for about 1.0 percent.
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b. Event Cycle
For this case study two separate event cycles
were studied. They were the order/receipt/payment cycle and
the reimbursement cycle.
The order/receipt/payment cycle begins with a
customer's request for a non-standard type of material. The
normal purchasing requirements are performed by a small
purchase buyer who reviews, approves and places the order
with the vendor. Once the buyer establishes that the
appropriate purchase method is to use the imprest fund, he
or she completes the required documentation for ordering the
requested material. This completed documentation is the
approval for the imprest fund cashier to take one of two
actions. These two actions involve either a cash advance to
the customer for pickup and payment or an establishment of a
material due-in order filed by delivery due-date. This
allows the cashier to monitor the requests for overdue
material requests. If material is overdue, the cashier
initiates a follow-up with the vendor to determine the
status of the expected material and to determine if any
further expediting is required by the original buyer or
customer. If the material is overdue for more than sixty
days, the order is returned to the buyer for a cancellation
action.
When a vendor delivers material for payment, the
delivery can take place in one of three ways. First, if
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delivery is made by the vendor through a customer pickup
process, the customer who wants to pickup the material has
received cash from the imprest fund cashier by signing a
cash-advance receipt. He then proceeds to the vendor with
the cash to receive and inspect the requested material. The
vendor provides a paid invoice to the customer, who will
ultimately return that invoice to the cashier in exchange
for a cash-advance receipt. Once this takes place, the
cycle is completed for the first example.
A second method for receipt and payment involves
delivery of the material to the Supply Department's
receiving section. Under this method, the material is
received and inspected at the shipyard. The receiving
branch acknowledges receipt on the vendor's delivery ticket
and returns the ticket to the vendor. The vendor then
presents the delivery ticket for payment to the imprest fund
cashier. At this point, the second example of the cycle is
completed.
The third way that material is delivered for
payment is through a direct material turnover process to the
customer. This third method for receipt is more of an
exception to the cycle than an expected norm. Certain items
require direct turnover due to their bulk or expendable
nature. A good example is dry ice. Because of the nature
of the material, the vendor delivers the material directly
to the customer. However, the vendor is still required to
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have the material inspected by the receiving section. This
requires the vendor to have an extra stop in the delivery of
the material. The vendor, after inspection, delivers the
material to the customer who signs the delivery ticket,
allowing the vendor to go to the cashier and receive
payment. Documentation received as part of a completed
order becomes part of a subvoucher that is retained until
the imprest fund is reimbursed [Ref. 28: sec. 13.4, p. 16].
A second cycle involved in the imprest fund
function is the reimbursement cycle. This cycle starts when
the cashier's fund is expended to a point where insufficient
cash is available to make any more cash payments on delivery
or to a point where no more cash advances can be provided to
a requesting customer using the direct material pickup
process. The cashier prepares a reimbursement voucher,
along with the supporting completed orders, to be exchanged
for a check from the shipyard's Comptroller. The check is
then cashed at the local bank. After receiving the cash,
the cashier returns the fund to his or her safe,
c. Finding
During the Fiscal Year 1986 management control
review, the functional line manager recognized one weakness
within each of the two imprest fund cycles. The weakness
attributable to the order/receipt/payment cycle centered
around the third method of material receipt. In those
exceptional cases, material was not always being received
84
and inspected before the cashier made a payment to the
vendor. The error in the order/receipt/payment cycle was
that the cashier was not getting adequate documentation for
inspection and acceptance of material; improper payments
occurred.
The second weakness occurred in the
reimbursement cycle. It dealt with the adequate
safeguarding of assets. As it turned out, the imprest fund
cashier was transporting cash over long distances within the
shipyard without benefit of any type of physical security.
The risk was a potential loss of cash through theft;
however, no robbery attempts had ever been made.
d. The Controls Used to Prevent Potential Errors
The order/receipt/payment cycle control
implemented after the management control review was to
reiterate the policy that all material paid for out of the
imprest fund would be inspected and signed for by the
Receiving Section prior to payment.
The reimbursement cycle control implemented was
to have shipyard Security escort the imprest fund cashier
when transporting cash to prevent theft.
e. Compliance Testing
The alternate imprest fund cashier performed the
routine duty of making payments. The imprest fund cashier,
on the other hand, acted as a supervisor who was expected to
maintain the larger quantity of cash and to monitor the
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alternate cashier's work. When the implemented control used
to correct the weakness in the order/receipt/payment cycle
was checked, the alternate cashier was still paying for the
exceptional purchases without a proper receipt and
acceptance delivery ticket. The control failed again
because the imprest fund cashier was not checking the
alternate cashier's work. A control that would have
encouraged the alternate cashier and the imprest fund
cashier to follow the policy of paying only properly
received and accepted delivery tickets would have been to
perform routine spot checks of both cashiers' work by the
Assistant to the Director of Purchasing. As the imprest
fund cashier's military supervisor, the Assistant to the
Director of Purchasing is knowledgeable of the procedures
and has no access to cash, receipts or authority to
authorize the purchase of materials. If the policy was
being violated, the director's assistant would catch the
problem in a more timely manner and take action to stop
further improperly authorized payments and, perhaps, relieve
one or both the cashiers of their responsibilities.
When the implemented control used to correct the
reimbursement cycle was checked, the alternate cashier was
getting a shipyard Security escort from the bank back to her
safe. What should have been taking place was the alternate
cashier being escorted from the Imprest Fund safe to the
Comptroller's building, where a check was to be exchanged
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for the completed imprest fund orders. Then, the alternate
cashier was to be escorted from the Comptroller's building
to the bank, where the check was to be exchanged for cash.
Finally, the alternate cashier was to be escorted from the
bank back to the imprest fund safe. Because the alternate
cashier was getting the escort only from the bank back to
the safe, shipyard policy requiring the escort for the
entire trip was being violated.
f. Risk Assessment
The order/receipt/payment cycle's inherent risk
is high because of the complexity of the cycle and the use
of a highly pilferable asset, cash. The control risk is
moderate because the control used does not always work. The
alternate cashier, in some cases, allows small dollar items
that are for direct delivery to bypass the receiving
control
.
The reimbursement cycle involves the use of cash
so the inherent risk is high. Control risk is moderate
because the weaknesses indentified in the next section still
exist even after the controls were added to the
reimbursement cycle.
g. Weaknesses with the System in Place
In both cycles physical protection of assets had
the potential for loss; the cashier's office was openly
accessible by other departmental personnel and they also had
access to the material due-in orders.
87
h. Management's Commitment Rating
Using the standardized questionnaire (Appendix)
,
the imprest fund line manager received a 97 percent score.
Program support was high, but the results of the compliance
testing indicated that follow-up on corrective actions was
not effective.
4 . Case C—Cash Flow in the Cafeteria System
a. Background
The cafeteria system is a non-appropriated fund
activity working as part of the Industrial Relations
Organization, which reports directly to the shipyard
commander. Its primary function is to provide retail
service outlets for shipyard employees' convenience in the
areas of shoes, bakery products and food services. The
system consists of eight outlets, including three
cafeterias, one shoe store, one bake shop and three
canteens. Annual revenues total approximately $1.5 million.
Direct cash collections through retail outlets total
approximately $6,000 daily, on a 20 day per month operating
cycle. Cash collections represent 96 percent of annual
cafeteria system revenues. Operation of non-appropriated
fund activities is supported by the Navy Industrial Fund
only to the extent to which those activities receive
facilities support. All other operations and expenses are
paid from revenues generated within the retail outlets.
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b. Event Cycle
This cash flow cycle begins with a collection agent
who picks up locked bags daily. The collections are made to
transport the daily earnings held by cashiers in various
locations to the cafeteria office. Each cashier has an
independently operated cash register which utilizes
serialized and metered cash register tapes. Cafeteria
cashiers share two consolidated collection bags, the three
canteen cashiers use individual collection bags and the bake
shop and the shoe shop use individual collection bags.
Although there are 12 cashiers there are only seven
collection bags for the collection agent to collect daily.
In the consolidated and the individual collection bags, the
cashiers place the cash register tapes and the individual
original Daily Activity Records, along with the cash
generated from sales in excess of the authorized change
funds. Each cashier retains a copy of the Daily Activity
Record, which represents each cashier's accountability.
This copy is later forwarded to the manager for cross
verification and filing.
The manager of the cafeteria system has total
responsibility for the proper operation of all accounting
and financial controls within the cafeteria system. As part
of the manager's office staff, three people are involved in
the cash flow process. Those persons are an assistant
manager, a collection agent and a secretary. The assistant
89
manager is responsible for accounting, the secretary
prepares the daily deposits and the collection agent
collects cash receipts and also handles the office telephone
and food ordering duties. The collection agent has no
access to the contents of the locked bags. They are given
to the office secretary, who validates the receipts,
prepares the daily deposit, and prepares a daily cash report
summary in two copies. One copy is forwarded to the manager
and one copy is given to the assistant manager for posting
journal entries. The secretary places the deposit in a
locked bag, which is given to the assistant manager for
delivery to the bank. The assistant manager does not have
access to the contents of any locked bag. The bank returns
the deposit slip via mail to the manager. Periodic
reconciliation is made by the manager, using the original
Daily Activity Reports, deposits and daily summaries. Each
person who has access to cash has one or more independent
checks of their work performed,
c. Finding
During the management control review in Fiscal
Year 1986, the line manager identified two weaknesses.
First, all funds and cash were not verified daily and,
secondly, cashiers were aware of the time and place when
their change funds were to be audited. The potential
problem resulting from not completely verifying cash
collections daily was that, if the secretary did not feel
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like prelisting all the receipts on the daily cash report
summary, she could hold one of the lock bags in her safe
overnight and make the entries on the following day. This
practice could cause two discripancies. First, the audit
trail tracing the complete days sales receipts from the
deposit slips would not match an audit made by the manager
when adding the individual daily activity records forwarded
from the cashiers. This would make tracing cash difficult.
Also the activity's accounting records would not show the
true sales on the day on which they occurred. The second
problem caused by the secretary holding cash overnight was
that the potential existed for her to use that cash for
personal purposes. This could be done by always leaving one
day's collection out to be posted later. With regard to
the second weakness noted, cashiers knowing the time and
place of change fund audits allowed for the possibility that
dishonest people could use the change fund for personal
business until they could return it to the cash register,
d. Controls Used to Prevent Potential Errors
As a result of the management control review,
the line manager developed two controls to eliminate the
potential errors identified in the preceding section. The
first control was designed to prevent the destruction of an
audit trail. The assistant manager performed daily spot
checks of the secretary's cash verifications to ensure that
all cash collection bags were included in the daily deposit.
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To eliminate the cashier's knowledge of when a change fund
was to be audited, the assistant manager conducted random
audits requested by the manager on short notice.
e. Compliance Testing
A review of this cycle by on site observation of
the process revealed all controls were in place and
operating as designed. The two new controls were also
operating and were verified by questioning the responsible
persons involved in the cycle.
f. Risk Assessment
The inherent risk in this cycle is high because
of the large number of cashiers and the extensive use of
cash. Control risk is low because controls are in place to
prevent theft. No one person or even one pair of persons
controls the collection process. This makes theft without
collusion quite difficult.
g. Weaknesses with the System in Place
During the compliance testing phase, one
additional weakness was noted and discussed with the line
manager. The potential weakness dealt with the fact that
neither the assistant manager nor the manager documented the
performance of the surprise change fund audits. Without
some sort of documentation proving the control was in place,
the manager could not verify which cashiers had undergone
surprise verification or if all cashiers were routinely
included for surprise verification. It was still possible
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for some cashiers to assume they may never be audited, if
they were missed routinely through oversight by the manager.
h. Management's Commitment Rating
Based on the standardized questionnaire
(Appendix) the line manager for this cash flow cycle was
rated at 97 percent. The tight controls and working
implementation noted during the compliance testing were
consistent with the attainment of that score.
5 . Case D—The Automated Data Processing Security
Function
a. Background
Automated data processing security function
includes all the measures required to protect against
unauthorized disclosure, modification, destruction or access
to Automated Data Processing (ADP) systems and data. Within
the shipyard, Navy Industrial Fund Accounting is performed
on ADP systems. The value of dollar transactions processed
on those ADP systems is $500 million annually. In addition
to the accounting consideration, shipyard ADP processes
three levels of information. Level one is classified
information, level two is information not available for
public or foreign access, and level three is all other
information. In order to provide adequate control over ADP
systems and data, the shipyard has an ADP Security Officer
who acts as the shipyard commander's expert for these
matters. The shipyard was using one main-frame computer,
eight mini-computers and hundreds of micro-computers with
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possible modem access to the mainframe. To provide adequate
security control, 39 ADP Systems Security Officers, four
Terminal Area Security Officers, two Office Information
Security Officers and two Network Security Officers report
to the shipyard's ADP Security Officer. The system is large
and expanding.
b. Event Cycle
There were ten different event cycles assigned
to the ADP Security Officer within the shipyard's ADP
instruction. The one identified for management control
review dealt with the ADP equipment acquisition process.
When a customer, usually a line manager, desires acquisition
of ADP equipment, he or she submits an 18-point justifica-
tion to Code 149, the Planning/Project Management Division
Head for authorization to initiate a procurement action.
The approval and purchase request are then forwarded to code
530, the shipyard's Purchasing Division, where the
procurement is started. Upon receipt of the material,
Supply's Receiving Section turns the equipment over to the
originator of the purchase request. The cycle is designed
to provide a centralized authorization point for shipyard
ADP procurement in order to maintain control over assets and
their applications.
c. Finding
During the management control review conducted
in Fiscal Year 1986, it was discovered that ADP equipment
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had been purchased for use on classified data, for which the
level of control was insufficient. Line managers were
requesting ADP equipment and Supply's Purchasing Agents were
buying ADP equipment that was not adequately secured to
process classified information. Thus, the possibility
existed that, once the ADP equipment was purchased,
expensive retro-fit would be required to protect the
classified material against unauthorized access.
d. The Controls Used to Prevent Potential Errors
The control used to correct the potential error
for purchasing inappropriate ADP equipment was to provide a
written security plan, along with the 18-point justifica-
tion, that identified the types of data and uses expected
for the equipment being requested. The ADP Security Officer
ensures that the equipment requested is appropriate for the
level of data being processed on that machine before any
procurement action can be taken.
e. Compliance Testing
Review of the cycle and the control in place
indicated that the new control was working. Observation and
interviews confirmed that an inappropriate procurement was
not being forwarded to Supply. Documentation was on file




Inherent risk is high, considering the decentra-
lized use of ADP eguipment and the levels of information
processed on those assets. Control risk is moderate
because, even with the new control in place, there is still
the possibility that the ADP collateral duty security
officers are not being notified that new eguipment has been
added to their areas of responsibility. This additional
weakness is discussed in the next section.
g. Weaknesses with the System in Place
One weakness was noted in the system. The new
control was designed to provide a centralized authorization
and control over ADP procurement. However, after the ADP
eguipment was received by Supply, the material was turned
over to the originator of the purchase reguest. No
notification was sent to the approving authority, Code 149,
that the eguipment was added to shipyard assets. The ADP
Security Officer had to depend upon the originator of the
reguest informing the supporting ADP collateral-duty
security officers that their area of control had been
expanded.
h. Management's Commitment Rating
Based on the standardized guestionnaire
(Appendix) , this line manager scored 44 percent. The
internal control program did not appear to be an effective
tool for this line manager.
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Because this line manager scored so poorly on
the standardized questionnaire, the researcher interviewed
him further to understand why the responses were so
different from those received from the other five line
managers interviewed. As explained in detail by this line
manager, he believed that in the beginning the internal
control program was a way to make permanent changes. He had
been disappointed to find that overall shipyard policy
concerning his areas did not change because of the
weaknesses he identified during the vulnerability
assessments. Almost all of the areas that he had assessed
were originally evaluated as being high in their exposure to
risk. When his assessments were forwarded to his department
head, he was required to reassess the ratings and provide
more detailed justifications as to the potential problems or
errors. He was firm in his belief that his original
assessments were correct and refused to make the requested
changes or to provide the additional detail outlining
specific weaknesses. Eventually, he was required to lower
his assessments because of not providing more specific
details. He stated that, from that point on, he would
provide only the inputs for the internal control program
specifically requested by the Internal Control Program
Coordinator.
The researcher went further to ask the Director
of Internal Review and the Internal Control Program
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Coordinator if they believed this line manager was unfairly
treated by his department head. They both confirmed that
this line manager was known to be overly zealous about the
potential risks and very vague in providing facts or
recommending possible corrective solutions. They attributed
these problems to that manager's poor health, which had
necessitated an involuntary job reassignment and induced his
superiors to make allowances for his opinions. Without
detailed weaknesses or corrective actions supplied by the
ADP Security Officer, the department head of this area had
no choice but to lower the assessments. The researcher
believes that the 44 percent score received by this line
manager is more attributable to the line manager's attitude
than actual lack of knowledge about the program.
The corrective action in this case fixed only
part of the entire cycle. Upon review, in nine other areas
not studied in detail here, this line manager failed to meet
any other target dates for making changes to weaknesses
identified during the Fiscal Year 1986 management control
reviews.
6 . Case E—Material Control in Shop 07
a. Background
Shop 07 is one of three facilities support shops
within the shipyard's Public Works Department. This shop
has an annual budget of $12 million, which represents three
percent of the entire shipyard's budget. Shop 07 employs
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pipe-fitters, machinists, equipment operators, carpenters,
masons, painters, electricians and at least seven other
types of tradesmen. Shop 07' s mission is to support the
maintenance and repair of all buildings and mechanical
distribution systems. In order to perform this ongoing
maintenance effort, Shop 07 utilizes a material warehouse,
tool room and key shop. All of these areas contain
expensive and highly pilferable materials. The warehouse
alone protects inventory that is valued at nearly $500
thousand.
b. Event Cycle
Material control is the event cycle recognized
as the most vulnerable within Shop 07. It starts with
material receipt by a custodian who places the material on
his inventory. Breakouts of the materials from the
warehouse, tool room or key shop are done by presenting the
appropriate requisitioning paperwork to the responsible
custodian. Each of the above three activities has its own
independent custodian, since each activity requires daily
operation and access. The custodian issues the material and
makes the requestor acknowledge receipt of the material or
tools in writing. This documentation is then used to reduce
the on-hand balance of the inventory. In case of tools,
when the requesting worker returns the tool the
documentation is returned to the worker and the custodian
increases his inventory. For the key shop, the emphasis of
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the cycle is to control physical access to equipment that
would allow the making of unauthorized keys. After hours
issues are controlled by computerized locking systems.
c. Finding
During the Fiscal Year 1986 management control
review, the line manager recognized that two weaknesses
required correcting. First the warehouses fire control
sprinkler system had no backup water shut-off capability.
The potential error here was the unnecessary accidental
exposure of material stored in the warehouse to water damage
caused by the sprinkler systems failure. Failures were
possible because of corrosion, water surges and earthquakes.
The second weakness focused on warehouse, tool room and key
shop access after the responsible custodian was gone for the
day. Emergency issues were not tightly controlled after
normal working hours. Accountability could never be
completely established when emergency issues required that
numerous keys be distributed to many foreman. This policy
contributed to a situation that could encourage the
custodian to make an unauthorized issue, because the
unrecorded issue could always be blamed on an emergency
issue.
d. Controls Used to Prevent Potential Errors
Two controls were implemented to eliminate the
weaknesses identified during the management control review
process. The first control was to place an external water
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shut off valve on the warehouse sprinkler system for
protection. The second control addressed the issue of
emergency access to the warehouse, tool room and key-shop.
Computerized locks were installed. This new locking system
electronically recorded all accesses made to the controlled
areas. It employed the use of serialized keys that were
assigned in writing to the various shop foreman and
custodians. If entry to a controlled space was made at
anytime, the date, time and person entering were recorded by
the computer. Daily the shop superintendent was given one
of two copies of the entries recorded on the previous day or
weekend. Personnel making emergency issues were tracked
down and the appropriate documentation was forwarded to the
custodian to reduce his accountability. The custodian got
one of the two entry printouts to alert him that emergency
issues were made. He could then follow up on the missing
paperwork and take a spot inventory.
e. Compliance Testing
Through observation and inquiry of the line
manager and his organization, the previously identified
controls were found to be in place and working as designed.
The internal control program worked in this case.
f. Risk Assessment
Inherent risk within the material control system
is high because of the large numbers of personnel requiring
after hours access to warehoused materials and tools. Also,
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the assets within those two areas of control are highly
pilferable items. Control risk is low because the cycle is
simple and direct.
g. Weaknesses with the System in Place
The only weakness noted with the new controls in
place was that the external shut off valve is not an
automatic system. The potential for damage was reduced but
not eliminated. However, the cost for a completely
automated water shut-off system was felt to be uneconomical
by the Public Works Officer, and funding was not available.
h. Management's Commitment Rating
The line manager in this case was interviewed
using the standardized interview (Appendix) and received a
score of 88 percent. The program for this manager was
working and being utilized in a similar but different format
on a daily basis. This alternate format was called the
"Error Cause Removal/Corrective Action" (ECR/CA) program.
The ECR/CA program is based upon the premise that each
employee executes a mini-management control review. When
potential problems exist, the individual employees are
requested to identify the problem and recommend corrective
actions they feel will correct the problem. The shop
superintendent reviews the recommendation and, if the new
control is determined to be a viable solution, he gives it
his full support for implementation.
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Shop 67 is one of 16 production shops within the
Naval Shipyard. It is responsible for weapon systems
electronic support. There were approximately 350 employees
that use tools and electronic test equipment on a daily
basis. Shop 67 represents 5 percent of the shipyard's
annual budget, with an $18.5 million expenditure in support
of the repair and overhaul mission. Tools are essential in
all production shops and this function has been a continuing
problem for management. The Naval Audit Service has
routinely found problems with the tool control function in
all shipyards. In this case, management of tools is
examined because it is a representative function common to
all shipyard production shops.
b. Event Cycle
Shop 67 tool control management begins with a
worker's need for a tool or tools. He proceeds to the
central tool room where he draws the required tool or tools.
The central tool room custodian records the tool, the date
drawn, the person drawing the tool, his shop and other
applicable data necessary to track the tool. Central tool
room issues are recorded by a computerized system. After
the tool is issued, the worker is given a due date when the
tool should be returned to the central tool room. The
interaction between the worker, the tool room and shop
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management is performed by computerized reports and
delinquency cards forwarded to Shop 67. Shop 67 ' s
management is then responsible to utilize these reports to
aid the shipyard's overall management and control of the
tool function. Shipyard instructions direct the shop
superintendents to coordinate with Code 906, the Central
Tool Shop Superintendent and to designate a shop tool
coordinator. His responsibility is to monitor delinquent
and missing tool reports and initiate follow-up actions.
Shop 67 's management cycle starts with the shop
tool coordinator. He receives four documents to aid
control: a Delinquent Tools Listing, Delinquent Tool Cards,
a Tools Due in 30 days Listing and a Missing Tools Report.
The shop tool coordinator sends Delinquent Tool Cards to the
worker's supervisor. The supervisor takes the appropriate
action to motivate the worker to return the tool to the
Central Tool Room. The worker is required to return the
tool and then provide proof to his supervisor in the form of
a returned custody chit or a delinquency card stamped
"returned" by the Central Tool Room. The supervisor
initials the card and returns it to the shop tool
coordinator, who monitors the return process.
The shop tool coordinator monitors the process
by using one listing, three reports, and one supervisor's
notice. The delinquency card return rate is monitored by
using the delinquency listing as a cross check to track
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delinquency cards issued and returned. Next, the shop tool
coordinator uses three Shop 67 reports to evaluate the
process of the overall tool control program. These reports
are a Summary of Administrative Actions and Lost Report, a
Lost Tools Report and a Monthly Delinquent Tool Report.
Finally, the shop tool coordinator issues a Supervisors
Delinquent Tool Notice that highlights which supervisors
have problems managing tool control actions. Using the
notice and the delinquency listings, the shop tool
coordinator initiates actions for the shop superintendent to
have the supervisors reprimand formally or informally
workers abusing the system. Stronger actions can also be
taken to collect money for loss of tools due to negligence
or theft. All tool losses are eventually charged to the
shop's overhead, but supervisors cannot approve losses in
excess of $50. All losses greater than $50 are approved by
the shop superintendent before they are charged to overhead.
An additional part of Shop 67' s tool control cycle is the
placement of all shop-owned tools in the central tool room
for issue and tracking. Shop-owned tools are not available
for issue to other shipyard shops,
c. Finding
During the Fiscal Year 1986 management control
review, the line manager recognized that delinquent shop-
owned tools were not being controlled and were causing
critical jobs to be delayed because of lost or missing
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specialized tools. The potential problems were theft and
lost time in repair of critical electronic systems.
d. The Controls Used to Prevent Potential Errors
There were two controls implemented to help
track shop-owned tools. First, all shop tools were
inventoried and turned into the Central Tool Room for issue
and control through the computerized system. Second, all
shop owned tools were placed on reserve for Shop 67 's use
only.
e. Compliance Testing
Observation of the system and review of the shop
tool coordinator's Delinquent Tools Listing, Summary of
Administrative Actions and Lost Report, Lost Tools Report,
and the Supervisors Delinquent Tool Notice indicated the
controls were in place. The internal control program worked
well in this case. Missing and delinquent tools dropped 18
percent between January and February 1988.
f. Risk Assessment
The inherent risk is very high because of the
decentralized use of tools and enforcement through large
numbers of supervisors. Tools are often pilfered and this
compounds the problems faced in controlling tools. Control
risk is high because most controls center in the Central
Tool Room, and these procedures do not extend past the
assignment of custody to the requesting worker.
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g. Weaknesses with the System in Place
There were no other weaknesses noted with the
controls in place.
h. Management's Commitment Rating
Based on a standardized questionnaire (Appendix)
this line manager received a score of 85 percent. Many of
the controls in the overall shipyard system were initiated
as recently as the past three years. Shipyard-wide
commitment for this area was reflected in Shop 67' s intense
management of tools. Costs are controlled tightly and
losses are charged to the Shop's overhead. Considering the
environment and attitude of the persons observed within Shop
67' s tool control function, support for the use of internal
controls was outstanding in Shop 67.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis was to determine if the
internal control program caused line managers to improve
their organization's event cycles; to determine under what
circumstances internal controls were used to make
improvements; and to determine if the controls used made a
lasting difference.
This thesis began with a general discussion of what
internal controls do, when they are applied, and how they
are tested. That discussion provided a general background
for the remainder of the study. Next the history of
internal controls in the Federal Government, the Department
of the Navy and one shipyard were provided to trace the
evolution of an internal control program. Included within
the historical review were requirements for an internal
control program and the internal control process. In
conclusion, the study focused on interviews, program
compliance and case studies to evaluate the implementation
and execution of the internal control process five years
after passage of FMFIA.
B. CONCLUSIONS
There are five conclusions drawn from this study.
108
1. The Navy's and the shipyard's internal control
programs have continually improved since the passage of
FMFIA. This conclusion is based on two things, a documented
history of improvements since 1983 and the examination of
one shipyard's internal control program. Having started
with a simple one page certification of whether the
shipyard's internal control systems meet the requirements of
FMFIA, the shipyard is now maintaining extensive records of
vulnerability assessments, management control reviews and
certifications. The certification, supported by this
additional information, comes closer to reflecting the true
status of the internal control systems used within the
shipyard. NAVAUDSVC audit reports covering the use of
internal controls also reflect that Navy-wide there has been
a steady improvement since the passage of FMFIA.
2. The internal control process worked best on small
and well defined event cycles where responsibility was
clearly identified. This conclusion is based on the
interview with the Director of Internal Review and the
researcher's ability to find documented cases where only
small and well defined event cycles were corrected by using
the internal control process. Recall that the Director of
Internal Review stated upper level management, at the
present, was unable to commit the personnel that are
necessary to address large complex event cycles. He based
his comments on the knowledge that the production mission
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consumed most of the available manpower. The researcher
reviewed all retained documents concerning the shipyard's
internal control program. There were no cases where
management control reviews were conducted on an event cycle
that extended beyond one manager's scope of authority.
Where management control reviews were performed by two
separate managers on similar event cycles, corrective
actions taken by one manager were independent of the other
manager's efforts.
3. The quality of the information used to certify that
the shipyard's internal control systems comply with the
requirements of FMFIA is heavily dependent upon the
voluntary cooperation of line managers. The questionable
reliability of that input is the extensive paperwork
associated with the internal control process. The Internal
Control Program Coordinator's strong dependence on the
cooperation of line managers results from his lack of
resources to thoroughly audit all the event cycles involved
in the internal control program. The program, during the
last update of vulnerability assessment inventories,
resulted in over 238 different assessable units. The
expertise necessary to evaluate that many different
assessable units and their possible resulting management
control reviews is beyond the limited resources of the
internal review staff or the Internal Control Program
Coordinator. Therefore, the coordinator has to rely on the
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input provided by line managers. However, a factor that
impacts on the quantity and quality of that input is the
extensive paperwork required by the internal control
program. Recall that the Director of Internal Review, the
Internal Control Program Coordinator and the line managers
all stated that one of their biggest problems with the
program was that it required too much paperwork. Also
recall that line managers were not given additional
personnel resources to conduct the internal review process.
So, with the manpower remaining constant and the workload
increasing, the line manager is forced to make a decision to
concentrate on completing the detailed paperwork or to
concentrate on conducting the vulnerability assessments and
management control reviews.
4. The shipyard's internal control program improved
after responsibility for the program was given to a
department head who was permitted to hire an internal
control coordinator. Prior to 1986, the internal control
program was performed on a collateral-duty basis within the
Management Engineering Branch. Documentation was
nonexistent, management control reviews and vulnerability
assessments were conducted by untrained personnel,
certifications of the shipyard's internal control systems
compliance with the requirements of FMFIA were made without
comprehensive supporting information and follow-up on the
program's results was not performed. After NAVSEA's
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Internal Control Coordinator reviewed the shipyard's
internal control program in 1986, a recommenda-tion was made
to reassign responsibility for the program to the Director
of Internal Review. Once the shipyard commander made the
change, the Director of Internal Review hired a full time
Internal Control Program Coordinator. The coordinator
caused all deficiencies, with the exception of an aggressive
follow-up program, to be corrected. The coordinator does
perform overall program review with the assistance of the
internal review staff. Review is not the same as aggressive
follow-up, however.
5. Aggressive follow-up on actions started, in progress
and completed remains a problem for management. This
conclusion is substantiated in all three NAVAUDSVC audit
reports conducted Navy-wide since the program's start. From
the field work, this researcher found cases where target
dates for management control reviews were missed and found
cases were internal controls were ineffective because line
managers failed to follow-up on the controls they
implemented. As already stated, the internal review staff
and the Internal Control Program Coordinator were performing
program review. A separate quality assurance effort is a
mandatory requirement for all levels of the shipyard's
management by NAVSEA Instruction 5200.13 [Ref. 22], and the




The existence of an internal control process is assured
as long as FMFIA remains the law. However, there remains
the need to make the internal control process part of a
manager's routine and not just a special evolution. The
recommendations that follow are based on this researcher's
experience from this study.
1. Since aggressive follow-up through the use of
quality assurance checks continues to be a problem, the
shipyard should develop a compliance testing schedule. It
should be executed by the departmental internal control
coordinators. The schedule should include all event cycles
that implemented internal controls during the previous
year's management control reviews. Results should be given
to the line managers and the Internal Control Program
Coordinator. Where controls fail to work, event cycles
should be included for another management control review.
To ensure that the departmental coordinators perform their
jobs, the internal review staff should perform surprise




The internal control program should be encouraged by
coupling it with an incentive system. In the Navy, there is
a beneficial suggestion program that pays federal employees
for suggesting changes that save money. An attempt should
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be made by the shipyard management to tie the internal
control process to the beneficial suggestion program.
3
.
The shipyard commander should appoint a committee to
identify large and complex event cycles that need to be
corrected by using the internal control process. The
committee would assign personnel to a task force that would
conduct a coordinated management control review. By using a
task force, no one manager would be made to accept the
entire burden for making changes. The workload could be
coordinated to identify a specific control objective that
meets the needs of all managers, and necessary internal
controls could be developed to meet that common objective.
4. Training needs to be expanded throughout all levels
of supervision within the shipyard. Currently, training is
provided only to departmental internal control coordinators.
The line managers train themselves by using SECDEF's
Internal Control Course [Ref . 5] . If management is to use
the internal control process as a matter of routine, all
personnel involved in the system need to have an idea of
how, when and where internal controls are used. Just as the
Navy requires monthly general military training or periodic
safety training, internal control training could be handled
on the same basis.
5. The last recommendation is to have more quality
assurance checks made by superiors outside the shipyard. In
the six year history of the Navy's Internal Control Program,
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NAVSEA visited the shipyard only once to review the
program's implementation. A periodic on-site review
encourages the shipyard to provide continued support to the
program. Without this on-site review, the shipyard would





Directions: Circle Appropriate Answer
1. Do you provide personnel for conducting vulnerability
assessments and management control reviews? (yes/no)
2. Do you have a current organizational structure in place?
(yes/no)
3. Are the right people doing the right jobs? (yes/no)
4. Do you have written guidance for workers defining their
jobs and the standards expected? (yes/no)
5. Do you have a good working knowledge of all your areas
of responsibility? (yes/no)
6. Is training available for you covering your job?
(yes/no)
7. Is training available for your subordinates covering
their jobs? (yes/no)
8. Have you considered each of the following objectives
listed below when managing your area of responsibility?
a. Management and supervisory responsibilities and
authority are clearly stated and understood?
(yes/no)
b. Resources are safeguarded against waste, loss,
unauthorized use and mismanagement? (yes/no)
c. Accounts, record and reports are reliable and
accurate? (yes/no)
d. Obligations are made in accordance with applicable
laws? (yes/no)
e. Transactions are executed in accordance with
regulations and policies? (yes/no)
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f. Internal control systems you use emphasize
prevention of specific or systematic weaknesses?
(yes/no)
Note: In the following questions, assume you are considering
developing internal controls to correct potential problems.
9. Does the cost of the controls currently used in most of
your systems outweigh the benefits from having the
controls in place? (yes/no)
10. Do you strongly support the use of the internal control
process by your subordinates? (yes/no)
11. Would you say all personnel working for you are
completely competent? (yes/no)
12. Are all the controls used in your systems effective for
getting the job done? (yes/no)
13. Do you maintain all the required records and files for
the internal control program? (yes/no)
14. Are transactions that require recording in your systems
recorded on time more than 85 percent of the time?
(yes/no)
15. Do you audit your subordinates work routinely to ensure
quality work? (yes/no)
16. Do you understand the purpose for having segregation of
duties? (yes/no)
17. Do your systems employ segregation of duties to protect
resources that could be used to personally benefit
someone in some way? (yes/no)
18. Is there adequate supervision of all personnel assigned
within your area of responsibility? (yes/no)
19. Are pilferable assets safeguarded by locks or other
similar security methods? (yes/no)
20. Do any of your areas of responsibility currently need
improvement to prevent the loss of assets and resources?
(yes/no)
21. Do you reevaluate your systems at least twice a year to
correct or add needed internal controls? (yes/no)
22. Have you requested an outside audit if one has not been
performed in the past two years? (yes/no)
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23. Have you any outstanding audit findings that are overdue
for correction? (yes/no)
24. Do you have procedures in place to discipline persons
caught committing fraud, waste or abuse? (yes/no)
25. Do you monitor corrective actions more often than
semiannually? (yes/no)
26. Are corrective actions from audits completed more often
than 50 percent of the time? (yes/no)
27. Is training performed in your areas more often than
semiannually? (yes/no)
28. Does training include training on the use of internal
controls? (yes/no)
29. Do you ask the internal review staff for help in
correcting difficult problems? (yes/no)
30. Do you use the internal review process for systems
beyond those mandated by the annual schedule from the
Internal Control Coordinator? (yes/no)
31. Do feel the internal control program is excessive?
(yes/no)
Key used in scoring: All answers are yes except numbers 9,
20, 2 3 and 31.
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